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TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT: THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE

Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1998

In an effort to promote employment flexibility and reduce the unemployment
rate, Spanish authorities deregulated temporary employment in the early 1980s.
Nonetheless, the deregulation o f temporary employment took place at the margin,
favoring the development of a dual labor market in which temporary workers
constituted a second class o f workers involuntarily employed and enduring limited
advancement opportunities.
Using data from the Spanish labor force survey, Spanish temporary
employment and job transitions into and out of temporary employment are examined.
The study first evaluates the incidence of Spanish temporary employment and its
involuntary and demand-led character. Secondly, the analysis reveals temporary
workers’ high tendency to perpetuate their precarious labor force status. How can
public policy facilitate temporary workers’ transitions to permanent employment?
In two Royal Decrees-Law from 1997 (RD 8/1997 and RD 9/1997), labor
unions, employers’ organizations and the Spanish Government approved on the
provision of various employers’ incentives when temporary contracts were converted
to permanent contracts or when hiring is done using indefinite contracts. The
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incentives included reductions in social security taxes and severance payments in the
event of a dismissal. However, the adopted policy measures have barely modified the
conversion rate of temporary contracts into permanent contracts and the percentage of
the Spanish workforce on temporary work arrangements. With the purpose of
improving the effectiveness o f future employment policies, this research uses
establishment level data to examine employers’ conversion of temporary contracts into
permanent contracts and their temporary employment hiring patterns. The analysis
uncovers employers’ flexibility needs and workers’ representation as major
determinants of the proportion o f the establishment’s workforce on temporary
contracts and the fraction o f temporary contracts being converted to permanent
contracts. Additionally, the results confirm the importance of hiring and dismissal
costs on the hired proportion o f temporary workers per establishment. However,
employers’ decision to convert temporary contracts to permanent contracts does not
appear to be significantly affected by hiring and dismissal costs. This finding might
help understanding the inefficacy displayed by the adopted policy measures in
promoting contract conversions from a temporary to a permanent status. Policy
implications following these results are subsequently discussed.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the last twenty years, labor markets have experienced significant
changes in their employment relationships. Economic openness has emphasized
international competition and uncertainty, the latter being associated with the
augmented volatility from the goods and labor markets (McKay, 1988). In this
context, firms have found the need to adopt new strategies to lower production and
labor cost while increasing productivity in order to remain competitive. Technology
and the automation o f the work place can also be considered important forces
encouraging firms' new strategies (Coates, 1988).
Flexibility in the labor and product markets emerged as the solution to attain
international competitiveness in face of these economic and technological forces
(Machines, 1988). However, labor market flexibility has been understood differently
by countries, depending on the labor market constraints and characteristics facing each
economy. For Europe and the United States, Piore (1986, p. 146) states:
In Europe, flexibility principally concerns the freedom of employers to lay off
and discharge workers in response to fluctuations in economic conditions.
Among North American employers, the term refers to the freedom to deploy
labor within the enterprise.
While the need for flexibility and international competitiveness have driven
much of the growth o f temporary employment in the U.S., structural, economic and
1
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2
institutional characteristics o f Spain’s recent history need to be additionally combined
to understand the somewhat unique growth of temporary employment in the Spanish
case.
Spain's neutral position during World War II and Franco's authoritarian regime
contributed to the country’s isolation until mid 1970s. As a result, economic
development was badly damaged. By 1975, Spain was still functioning under an
obsolete economic infrastructure with a paternalistic system o f industrial relations
characterized by a strong government intervention and centralized collective
bargaining. Lifetime jobs were protected at the cost of prohibiting unions and
employers' organizations (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993). The need for a reform of the
labor market institutions and employment contracts that would allow for a democratic
participation of the labor force and a flexible economic environment where Spanish
firms could compete with their foreign counterparts, was especially evident after the
Francoist regime in 1975.
The political reforms initiated with the "Moncloa Pacts" o f 1977 and followed
by the approval o f the Spanish Constitution in 1978 led to the passing of the main
piece of legislation regarding the labor market, the Workers' Statute from 1980. The
Workers’ Statute was amended in 1984 to accommodate the flexibility needs of a
changing labor market and an economy in recession. In contrast with its predecessor
the Law of Labor Relations 16/1976, which allowed for temporary contracts under
very specific and limited circumstances, the 1984 reform to the Workers' Statute
facilitated the use o f temporary contracts through the creation o f new contractual
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arrangements such as fixed-term, training and practice contracts. The new contracts,
all o f them temporary in nature, significantly reduced employers' hiring and dismissal
costs. Consequently, temporary employment quickly rose, reaching more than a third
o f the labor force by 1994. It is the magnitude of temporary employment as well as its
socioeconomic and labor market environment and implications that make the Spanish
case a particularly interesting one to examine.
The rapid growth o f Spanish temporary employment, regardless o f its possible
contribution at reducing the unemployment rate, came at the cost of the emergence of
a dual labor market. As Bentolila and Dolado (1994) explain, the gained flexibility
through temporary employment mostly came at the margin.1 As a result, a dual labor
market composed of an inner core of stable workers (insiders) and an external group
o f peripheral workers (outsiders) enduring worse working conditions, opportunities of
advancement, lower wages and benefits, and bargaining power than their permanent
counterparts, quickly developed. Under this setting, the importance of examining: (a)
the motivations for workers to accept temporary jobs and the involuntary versus
voluntary character of temporary employment, along with (b) whether temporary
employment facilitates for workers the transition towards permanent employment
instead of perpetuating and worsening their well-being, becomes evident. This
research thus focuses on the above issues.
Furthermore, since the mid 1990s, Spanish unions, employers’ organizations
and Government, aware of the involuntary nature displayed by temporary employment
and preoccupied about its implications on net employment, job security and workers’
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morale, have participated in tripartite agreements promoting employment stability.
Their content has been primarily captured in the Law 8/1997 and Law 9/1997. The
latest agreements have primarily focused upon the provision of firm incentives to
promote job security by: (a) converting temporary contracts into permanent ones, and
(b) limiting employers’ reliance on precarious employment (Preamble-Law 8/1997 and
Law 9/1997). Nonetheless, during 1998, unions have denounced the inefficacy of the
adopted measures in promoting employers’ conversion of temporary contracts into
permanent ones and in reducing the proportion o f the workforce on precarious
employment. In particular, the latter was only reduced in two decimal points from
33.8 percent in 1996 to 33.6 percent of the labor force in 1997 (ABC, Diario de
Economia, 10 de Agosto, 1998). These facts point towards the need to improve our
knowledge on potentially effective policy instruments to promote job security. This
dissertation also addresses this void with a careful examination o f Spanish employers’
temporary employment practices. In particular, I analyze employers’ hiring of
temporary workers and research the determinants of their contribution in facilitating
temporary workers’ transitions to permanent employment by converting temporary
contracts into permanent work arrangements, as well as those driving the proportion
of their workforce on temporary contracts.
Summarizing, this research addresses the following policy questions: how did
the Spanish historical, economic and institutional background contribute to the rapid
growth of temporary employment? Which are the major supply and demand side
determinants of temporary employment in Spain? Provided the duality created in the
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Spanish labor market by the deregulation o f temporary employment “at the margin”,
how desirable is temporary employment? Does it favor workers’ transition to non
contingent forms o f employment? If it does not facilitate such a transition, what has
been temporary employment’s contribution to job creation, job destruction, job
reallocation and worker reallocation with respect to that o f permanent employment
during the 1990s? If, as judged by Spanish unions and the Government in 1996-1997,
the duality o f the Spanish labor market following the rapid increase of temporary
contracts appeared worrisome, can we identify the economic variables that might
effectively modify employers’ temporary employment practices and promote stable
employment? In particular, what are the determinants of employers’ conversion of
temporary contracts into permanent contracts and of the extent o f their reliance on
temporary employment?
To address these issues, the research is organized in various chapters. Chapter
II describes the economic, institutional and legal background o f temporary
employment in Spain. Previous work by Jimeno and Toharia (1993) discusses the
institutional setting of the Spanish labor market, although not in the context of
temporary employment. In a later study, Jimeno and Toharia (1994) provide an
excellent summary o f the economic and labor changes experienced by the Spanish
economy in the last decades, while they briefly comment on the regulation of
employment contracts and firing costs. Lastly, Segura, Duran, Toharia and Bentolila
(1991) examine the legal framework of temporary employment in Spain and in some
European countries up to 1990. I combine the analysis o f the most recent
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macroeconomic trends, institutional change and regulation of temporary contracts to
gain a better understanding o f the institutional framework behind the rapid growth of
temporary employment experienced by the Spanish economy.
Chapter III explores the involuntary character o f Spanish temporary
employment, the duality o f the Spanish labor market and labor mobility patterns
between temporary and permanent employment using the Spanish Labor Force survey.
The chapter begins with a brief analysis o f the incidence o f temporary employment, its
involuntary character and job transition rates. The empirical analysis o f workers'
motives to enter temporary employment, the effectiveness o f the latter in facilitating
temporary workers' mobility to a non-contingent job, and the supply side factors
affecting such transition are then examined.
Following the research recommendations from the Women's Bureau at the
U.S. Department of Labor (1988), the longitudinal nature o f the data is exploited to
collect work history data on temporary workers and study their transitions from and to
different labor market statuses. The analysis examines the variables that may
significantly influence their decisions to enter into temporary employment and to exit
towards a permanent work arrangement. More specifically, attention is paid to
whether temporary employment is used as a vehicle or bridge to move from
unemployment into permanent employment, as suggested by Buchtemann and Quack
(1989) for the Federal Republic o f Germany, or if it rather becomes a workstyle or

trap for temporary workers.
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The analysis carries an important policy content. Considering the previous
evidence on the precariousness and worse working and salary conditions of temporary
employment with respect to permanent employment (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993),
temporary employment directly affects the well-being of contingent workers. Policy
action might be recommended if temporary employment institutionalizes a secondclass of workers with low wages and benefits, little training, poor working conditions
and few opportunities of advancement.2
In this vein, Spanish unions, employers’ organizations and Government, aware
of the involuntary nature displayed by temporary employment and concerned about its
implications on net employment, job security and workers’ morale, have participated in
tripartite agreements promoting employment stability (Preamble-Law 8/1997 and Law
9/1997). Laws 8/1997 and 9/1997 capture the essence o f the latest agreements and
regulate firm incentives focused on promoting job security by: (a) converting
temporary contracts into permanent ones, and (b) limiting firms’ reliance on precarious
employment (Preamble-Law 8/1997 and Law 9/1997). However, Spanish unions’
complaints about the inefficacy o f the adopted incentives on promoting employment
security during 1997-1998 reveal the need to identify the demand-led determinants of
employers’ temporary employment practices to design effective policies.
Consequently, I also examine employers’ temporary employment practices, such as
their hiring and intensive reliance on temporary workers, and their conversion of
temporary contracts to permanent contracts.
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Previous work using Spanish firm level data has focused on the effect of
temporary employment on workers’ wages, productivity and on the employer’s
decision to provide formal training (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Alba-Ramirez, 1994).
However, very little is known about the determinants of employers’ temporary
employment patterns. I address this gap in the literature with the following demandside analysis.
Using establishment level data from the Ministry of Labor along with Davis
and Haltiwanger’s methodology (1992), I examine temporary versus permanent job
creation and job destruction patterns, job and worker reallocation rates during the
1990s. Some evidence on temporary employment’s contribution to the creation of net
employment by type of industry over the 1990-1996 period and how its contribution
compares to that o f permanent employment is also presented. The empirical evidence
helps us familiarize ourselves with the employment implications of temporary work
arrangements and, thus, understand unions’ and the Government’s concern over the
intensive use of temporary workers by Spanish employers.
Provided the inefficacy of the adopted measures in augmenting job security,
Chapter V examines employers’ constrained hiring patterns and evaluates their
contribution to employment stability by transforming temporary contracts into
permanent and by limiting the number of temporary employees in their workforce.
First, a brief review of the incidence and distribution of Spanish temporary
employment by establishment characteristics is completed to identify those factors that
the analysis of employers’ temporary employment practices needs to control for.
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Subsequently, the determinants of employers’ conversion o f temporary contracts into
permanent work arrangements and the proportion o f their workforce on temporary
workers are researched. The analysis reveals the importance o f hiring and firing costs
of temporary versus permanent workers, employment expectations, and worker
representation on employers’ intensive reliance on temporary workers and, of the last
two variables, in promoting temporary employees to more secure work arrangements
within the firm.
Lastly, Chapter VI summarizes the main findings from this research and
discusses future challenges and research ideas.
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CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF
SPANISH TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT GROWTH

Before examining Spain's temporary employment experience, a close
examination of the Spanish economic, institutional and legal framework, and their joint
contribution to temporary employment growth is required. This chapter provides a
comprehensive look at Spain's system o f industrial relations, its employment history,
economic trends and labor law, and how they have shaped its labor market structure.
Spain's economic and labor market trends from Franco's regime to the present
are first discussed. Spain’s traditionally high unemployment rates might have
contributed to the rapid growth o f temporary employment through the provision o f an
excess supply of workers willing to accept the worse working conditions associated
with temporary contracts. A thorough analysis o f the Spanish system o f industrial
relations and social security follows so as to ascertain how the organization of
collective bargaining and employers’ reduced social security contributions and
dismissals costs for temporary workers might have favored temporary employment
growth. The deregulation o f temporary contracts and their legal and employment cost
differences with respect permanent contracts are subsequently discussed as likely
explanations for the rapid growth o f temporary employment. Finally, the joint

10
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contribution to the Spanish experience of economic and labor market trends,
institutional and legal aspects o f temporary employment is discussed in the conclusion.

The Spanish Economy and Labor Market

The international crisis from the first oil shock that hit Spain in the mid-1970s,
the second oil shock of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods system o f fixed exchange rates, new technological changes and the financial
liberalization and deregulation of product markets coincided with the political reforms
after Franco. It was a period o f transition during which the economy did not
immediately display signs o f economic recovery and employment growth. We
distinguish three phases in the recent Spanish economic history.

The Transition to Democracy: 1975 to 1985

These were recession years for the Spanish economy, which was undergoing
the economic changes accompanying democracy and international openness. Real
GDP annual average growth rates (at 1980 market prices) in agriculture,
manufacturing, construction and services were low, reaching 1.4, 1.4, -1,7, and 3
percent respectively (Jimeno and Toharia 1994). Economy wise, real GDP only
increased at a mere annual rate of 1.6 percent between 1975 and 1985.
Unemployment rose as a result o f job destruction in the agriculture, manufacturing and
construction sectors.
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By 1985, unemployment had reached 21.6 percent of the labor force (Jimeno
and Toharia, 1994). With the purpose o f curbing the unemployment rate and
promoting employment creation, the Workers' Statute reform was approved in August
1984. The new legislation introduced a series o f flexible work arrangements under the
new fixed-term, practice and training contracts. The latter, all o f them temporary in
nature, provided employers with job creation incentives consisting o f firing and hiring
cost reductions with respect to open-ended contracts.
Prior to 1980, the Spanish employment legislation was highly paternalistic and
protective o f job security. The Law of Labor Relations from 1976 (Law 16/1976)
allowed, almost uniquely, for indefinite contractual relationships characterized by high
dismissal and hiring costs. In very specific circumstances, the law permitted the
conclusion o f temporary contracts but, for the most part, they were considered
practically illegal. As a result, temporary contracts were hardly observed. The
passage o f the Workers’ Statue Law 8/1980 and the Basic Employment Law (Law
51/1980) put end to this lack o f contractual flexibility by increasing the instances under
which temporary contracts, characterized by lower firing and hiring costs, could be
signed between the parties.
Permanent contracts’ dismissal costs, however, remained mostly unchanged.
In fact, even from 1980 on, articles 53 and 56 from the Law 32/1984 and from the RD
1/1995, which amended the Workers’ Statute Law 8/1980, still contain the same
provisions stated in the original Law 8/1980 concerning firing costs o f permanent
workers. Particularly, permanent workers’ dismissals need to be accompanied by a
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written notice to the worker and the workers’ representative expressing the reasons
for the dismissal. In addition, an advance notice of 30 days minimum, during which
the employee has the right to use up to six paid hours a week to look for another job,
is also required. Severance payments for permanent workers amount to 20 days per
year of tenure with a maximum o f 12 monthly payments. Nevertheless, these can be
more than doubled if the worker believes the dismissal was unfair, sues the employer,
and Labor Courts decide in his favor, in which case severance payments augment to 45
days per year o f tenure with a maximum of 42 monthly payments. In the latter case,
the employer would also have to pay the wages and social security taxes
corresponding to the time period between the dismissal and the notification of the
judicial decision.
Under the new temporary contracts, dismissal costs were considerably
reduced. To start, workers could not sue their employers in the event their dismissal
was considered unfair, severance payments were either non-existent or significantly
lower, and no advance notice o f dismissal was required for most temporary contracts,
unless the contract duration exceeded one year. In addition, some temporary
contracts, such as practical and training contracts, allowed for reduced social security
taxes and wages.
Spanish employers, facing an environment of economic recession and
uncertainty did not want to commit to long term employment relationships.
Consequently, they made extensive use o f these more flexible and cheaper contractual
arrangements, and temporary employment started to quickly rise.
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The Economic Recession o f Late 1980s and Early 1990s

New economic policies increased international trade and openness contributing
to the recovery o f GDP and employment rates after 1986. Between 1986 and 1992,
real GDP annual growth rate averaged 4.2 percent, compared to 1.6 percent prevailing
during the transition to democracy years. Employment, instead o f decreasing by 1.5
percent, grew at the rate of 2.8 percent across all sectors (Jimeno and Toharia, 1994).
The construction sector, followed by service and manufacturing, benefited from the
economic growth trend the most. However, employment continued to fall in
agriculture. Across all sectors, the unemployment rate dropped from 21 percent in
1986 to 16 percent of the labor force by 1992 (INE, BME). Nevertheless, a 16
percent rate o f unemployment was still high compared to the average 9 percent
unemployment rate in the rest of the European Community countries (INE, BME).
Spain's economic performance reversed with the arrival of the 1991-92
recession. The GNP growth rate declined from 2.3 percent in 1991 to -1.2 percent
in1993 (INE, BME). Even though the employment rate kept increasing throughout
those years, the active labor force grew at an even faster rate, impeding an
improvement o f the unemployment rate. As a result, unemployment soared, and by
the second quarter o f 1994 it reached 24.4 percent of the labor force (INE, BME).
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The Economic Recovery in the Mid 1990s

The economic crisis of the early 1990s retrogressed during the second half of
the 1990s. The unemployment rate, along with other economic indicators, showed
signs of recovery as documented in Espana en Ciffas, 1995-96. Gross national
product growth rates (computed at 1986 prices) substantially improved from -1.2
percent in 1993 to 3.0 percent in 1995. Sectors' weight in the economy had also
changed drastically since 1975. The Spanish economy was now a service economy
with 60 percent of GNP accounted by this sector. Manufacturing accounted for 31 to
35 percent of GNP and agriculture for approximately 4 to 5 percent of GNP. Private
demand increased, contributing 3 to 4 percent to GNP growth.
During 1996-97, the external and national demands have experienced an
outstanding growth promoted by an uplifted exporting sector and rising investment
and private consumption rates. Low inflation, international economic recovery, and
the dollar appreciation, have favored the international competitiveness o f Spanish
products. Investment and consumption have expanded along with low interest rates,
deficit reductions of approximately 15 to 20 percent, and positive expectations about
future economic growth with the entrance in the European Monetary Union by 1999.
The labor market, in particular, has being characterized by a continuous
decrease in the unemployment rate since 1994. During 1996, the unemployment rate
was reduced to 21.7 percent of the labor force, and during 1998 unemployment had
reached its lowest level (20 percent) since 1981. Employment has grown by 2.95
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percent from June 1996 to June 1997, favoring women and young age workers the
most (ABC-Diario de Economia, August 11, 1997). Industry wise, employment has
increased the most in services, followed by manufacturing and construction, while it
has continued to decrease in agriculture. By type o f contract, the number of
permanent contracts signed during 1997 (266,200 contracts) has doubled the number
of new temporary contracts (137,700 contracts). Nevertheless, the weight of
temporary employment in the Spanish labor market remains unusually high with
temporary contracts still representing 25.48 percent of total employment (ABC, Diario
de Economia, July 31, 1997).

The Spanish System of Industrial Relations

The described Spanish economic and labor market trends during the last
decades have been partially shaped by its institutional and legal environment. Thus,
the importance of examining the Spanish system of industrial relations for an improved
understanding of the Spanish labor force structure and the development o f temporary
employment. I start by, first, discussing Spain's main workers' and employers'
institutions involved in the development of employment contracts. The Social Security
system along with the scope and structure o f collective bargaining in Spain is then
briefly presented. Special attention will be placed on the role played by the industrial
relations framework in determining hiring and dismissal costs in a permanent versus a
temporary contract, and how cost differences have contributed to the rapid growth of
temporary employment in Spain.
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Workers1Representation in Spain

The Workers’ Statute in 1980 filled up the legislative gap on workers'
representation rights existing after Franco's dictatorship. Three channels of workers'
representation are contemplated in the Statute: trade unions, work councils and
workers' delegates. However, since most elected workers’ delegates or workers’
representatives in work councils are unionized, these three channels are often difficult
to separate.
Trade unions developed during the eighteen century and were considerably
spread out by the 1930s (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993). However, the authoritarian
regime following the Spanish Republic of 1933, put an end to workers' and employers'
representation by regulating a vertical union with compulsory membership and strong
government intervention. Unions became legally recognized under the new
democratic system and the Moncloa's Pacts, in 1977. Affiliation became voluntary.
Two are the main trade unions in Spain, the UGT (Union General de Trabajadores,
socialist) and the CCOO (Comisiones Obreras, communist). Nonetheless, since the
Spanish system of labor relations is not a “closed shop” system, workers have the right
to elect their representatives, who may belong to a union or be non-unionized.
However, as Jimeno and Toharia (1993) very clearly explain, the vast majority of
workers’ representatives (70 percent) do belong to one o f the two unions mentioned
above. As a result, 90 percent o f all collective agreements are signed with the
participation of a union. Therefore, although union density in Spain, as in the United
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States, is relatively low, the effective unionization rate (the proportion of workers
represented by unions in collective bargaining) is relatively high. Table 1 shows the
most recent scope of collective bargaining in Spain. Unions participate in most (more
than 95 percent) sectoral/industry level agreements and less in local/firm level
agreements, where 20 percent of workers’ representatives are non-unionized (Jimeno
and Toharia, 1993).

Table I
Scope of Collective Bargaining From January 1997 to July 1997

Firm Level

Industry Level

All Agreements

Workers Affected
(Thousands)

412,707

5,167,754

5,580,461

% o f Total Labor
Force

61.65%

85.29%

82.06%

1,114

385

1,499

No. of Agreements

Source: Secretaria de Accion Sindical de UGT.

More than eighty percent o f the workers are affected by unions' collective
bargaining. Spanish unions do exert a strong influence in wage negotiations and the
regulation of other hiring and turnover costs, as well as on the working hours, job
security, and work incentives since Spanish authorities have traditionally sought their
opinion provided the high unemployment rate.
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Works Councils are constituted in large firms with more than fifty permanent
workers, and workers' delegates are elected for those firms with less than fifty and
more than six permanent workers. However, temporary workers can only elect one
workers’ representative per twenty-five employees in those firms where they account
for more than 20 percent o f the labor force. Since most workers’ representatives are
unionized, temporary workers’ union representation is considerably reduced with
respect to that of their permanent counterparts. Consequently, unions are more
responsive to the interests o f permanent workers, which enhances insiders ’ negotiation
power.
Appointments to works councils and workers' delegates are renewed every two
years, and all workers' representatives are given a number of paid hours to develop
their functions. Some o f their competencies include controlling for the employers'
compliance to the various employment and Social Security laws, and to collective
agreements on wage and working conditions. To accomplish their functions, workers'
representatives are given a number of paid hours per year.

Employers' Organizations

Two are also the major employers' organizations in Spain: CEOE
(Confederation Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales-Spanish Confederation of
Businesses) and CEPYME (Confederation Espanola de Pequenas y Medianas
Empresas-Spanish Confederation o f Small and Medium Size Firms). As in the case of
unions, affiliation is not obligatory and effective rates of employers' representation in
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most negotiations is high. They participate in most tripartite collective bargaining
along with UGT, C C .00 and the government, as well as in other inter-confederation
agreements without the government's presence, such as the ones on collective
bargaining and employment stability on April 7, 1997.

The Spanish System of Social Security

The Spanish social security system, regulated by the Law and Royal Decree
LGSS-R.D.L.G. 1/94, provides with sickness and unemployment benefits, retirement
and family pensions, and other economic assistance according to the 1978 Spanish
constitution (article 41). The system is composed of one general and several special
regimes, the latter distinguishing between workers in the agriculture and mining
sectors, fishermen, self-employed workers, home-workers and students. Affiliation is
obligatory to all workers and students. Employers are required to communicate any
changes in their workforce to the Administration for social security taxes purposes.
The Spanish Social Security system is a pay-as-you-go system where both,
workers and employers contribute, although in different amounts and for different
contingencies. Workers' contributions help cover unemployment, training, overtime
work hours, and the so-called common contingencies, such as sickness benefits, death
and survival insurance, permanent or temporary incapacity, family protection benefits,
and retirement pensions. Firms, in addition to these, must pay work-accident and
professional-illness contingencies, as well as a guarantee wage fund fee.
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Contributions are computed using the percentages3 fixed annually by the
government for each type o f contingency to the worker's wage base, the latter
coinciding with the wage itself, excluding any other payments to the worker. These
contributions determine the retirement pension, unemployment benefit and other
individual and family economic assistance in the future. In order to receive a
retirement pension the worker must have contributed a minimum o f 15 years, from
which at least two must lie within the last eight years before retirement. The
retirement pension may reach 100 percent of the pension base4 if the worker retires at
the age of 65 and with 35 years o f work experience.
Unemployed workers also have the right to unemployment benefit or subsidy.
To be eligible for unemployment benefit the individual must have contributed at least
twelve months within the six years period before becoming unemployed. The duration
of the unemployment benefit varies according to the number o f days contributed
during the previous six years to becoming unemployed. The minimum unemployment
insurance duration is 120 days when the worker has contributed between 360 and 539
days during the last six years. The maximum unemployment insurance duration is 720
days when the worker and the employer have been contributing at least 2,160 days
during the previous six years to becoming unemployed. The unemployment insurance
equals 70 percent o f the regulatory base5 for the first 180 days o f the its duration, and
60 percent thereafter. These amounts are always subject to some m inim um s and
maximums regulated by law, such as a minimum o f $350 per month for workers 16 to
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17 years old and with no dependents and a maximum of $1,140 per month for those
individuals 18 or older with two or more dependents.

The Scope and Levels o f Collective Bargaining in Spain

The Spanish social security system regulates some hiring costs, such as
employers' and workers' taxes for various contingencies. Nevertheless, there are
additional employment cost components, such as wages, largely determined through
collective bargaining. Spanish unions mostly negotiate over wages, working hours and
job security, the latter through various measures such as increasing dismissal costs.
Minimum wages are fixed annually by the Government and wage differentials on the
base o f the contract's temporary nature are illegal. However, Jimeno and Toharia
(1993) find that temporary workers earn, on average, up to 11 percent less per hour
worked than permanent workers with similar characteristics.
Table 2 shows the evolution o f negotiated wage increases since 1988 by
bargaining level. The overlapping of collective agreements at the different negotiation
levels over certain issues, such as wage increases, has led unions and employers'
organizations to the approval o f an inter-confederation agreement on collective
bargaining in April, 1997, where the objectives o f firm and industry level negotiations
are clearly delimited.
The number of working hours is also subject to collective bargaining. The
Workers’ Statute (article 34) specifies that working hours should be negotiated
through collective bargaining or labor contract, as long as the maximum o f 40 weekly
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Table 2
Wage Rate Increases Negotiated by Level of Collective Bargaining

December

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Firm Level

5.69

7.34

8.05

7.81

7.03

4.69

3.17

3.69

3.52

Other
Levels

6.50

7.84

8.37

7.99

7.31

5.61

3.66

3.98

3.92

All Levels

6.38

7.77

8.33

7.96

7.27

5.48

3.59

3.94

3.87

Source: Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales various issues. Madrid: Ministerio de
Trabajo y Seguridad Social.

work hours regulated by law and the minimum of 12 hours o f rest between work spells
are respected. A similar policy stands with respect to the number o f overtime work
hours, limited to 80 hours per worker a year (RD 1/1995, article 35). Holidays and
vacation periods are also negotiable by workers’ and employers’ representatives as
long as the maximum of 14 holidays and the minimum o f 23 days o f vacation are being
observed (RD 1/1995, articles 37-38).
Finally, firing costs, such as advance notice of layoff and severance payments,
are regulated in the RD 1/1995, articles 53 and 56. When the labor contract is ended
objectively, the law requires a severance payment of 20 days per year of service with a
maximum o f 12 monthly payments. Additionally, the RD 1/1995 (article 53) requires
that the employer gives an advanced notice of layoff of one, two or three months
depending on whether the worker’s tenure is less than a year, between one and two
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years, or two or more years. During those months previous to dismissal, the worker is
entitled to use up to six paid hours per week to look for a new job. In the case an
advance notice is not provided, the employer will have to additionally pay the wages
corresponding to those months. Lastly, workers can sue their employers if they
believe they have been illegally fired. If the Labor Courts find the dismissal unfair,
severance payments are increased to 45 days per year o f service with a maximum o f 42
monthly payments. In addition, the employer has to pay social security taxes and
wages corresponding to the period between the dismissal and the notification of the
judicial decision.
The number of dismissals brought to a Labor Court has increased over the
years, with a significant number of cases ruled in favor o f the employee and, thus,
rising firing costs for employers. As a reference, EIRR (1993) reports that in 1991,
eleven percent of all dismissals were referred to the Labor Courts, out of which 73
percent were resolved through judicial rulings and the remaining 27 percent through
the parties’ conciliation. The average compensation reached 897,400 pesetas
(approximately $6,000) in the former case, and 721,400 pesetas (approximately
$4,800) in the latter case.
With respect to collective bargaining levels, the RD 1/1995 (article 87)
distinguishes two main levels: the local/firm level and a higher level, such as the
sectoral/industry or even national level. A maximum o f twelve representatives of both
workers and employers is allowed at the firm level negotiations, and a maximum of
fifteen at the higher level negotiations. Workers’ delegates and work councils
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participate at the firm level negotiations. At the industry level, trade unions with more
than 10 percent o f workers’ delegates or work councils’ members in the sector
negotiate with those employers’ organizations with at least 10 percent of the
employers affected by the agreement. When agreements present a national scope,
trade unions with 15 percent of workers’ delegates or work councils’ members
affected by the negotiation will be legitimated to participate in the collective
bargaining. Agreements are only enforceable to the signing parties. Nonetheless, the
RD 1/1995 (article 92) observes the possibility for the government to extend the
agreement to all firms within a particular industry if the main workers’ and employers’
organizations in the sector agree upon it.
Despite o f the large percentage o f the labor force and temporary employees
affected by collective bargaining, temporary workers have not had much voice in these
negotiations. The existing legislation affects their representation by works councils,
workers’ delegates and, since most of them are unionized, by unions. This is an
important aspect o f the system of industrial relations which accentuates the importance
of collective bargaining and unions’ clout in understanding firms’ conversion of
temporary contracts to permanent contracts and the proportion of temporary workers
in their workforce. Firms’ contract conversion from temporary to permanent is
favored by unions’ negotiations and recent agreements with employers’ organizations
and the Government to promote stable employment. However, whether the
proportion o f temporary workers in the firm increases or decreases in the presence o f
collective bargaining depends on the following two effects.
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On the one hand, since wage differentials on the base of the type o f contract
are illegal, unions’ wage bargaining results in a decreasing proportion o f the temporary
workers held by firms once temporary workers’ lower productivity is taken into
consideration (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993). On the other hand, the high unemployment
rate traditionally experienced by the Spanish economy has frequently preoccupied
workers’ unions. As a result, much o f their negotiations are focused on ensuring a
lower probability o f dismissal for its members, particularly permanent workers who
constitute a majority and enjoy higher institutional recognition and control over
workers’ representatives. Increased job security raises the dismissal costs of
permanent workers and, thus, makes temporary workers more attractive to firms and
increases the proportion o f temporary workers in their workforce. Consequently, the
effect of collective bargaining on the degree o f firms’ reliance on temporary workers
ultimately depends on which of the mentioned effects empirically dominates in the
Spanish case.
Temporary work deregulation is now examined and compared with permanent
employment provisions to uncover the role of deregulation in the expansion of
temporary employment.

The Legal Framework of Temporary Contracts in Spain

Since the death o f Franco, in 1975, the Spanish labor market and its regulation
have undergone major transformations. Many o f these changes were intended to help
the Spanish economic recovery from years of recession, creating new jobs and
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promoting a more flexible labor force. Gaining flexibility in the labor market proved
to be a difficult task since it implied a complete break-through from the highly
paternalistic employment regulation contained in the Law o f Labor Relations (Ley de
Relaciones Laborales, law 16/1976 o f 8 April 1976), the Spanish Jurisprudence and
other various labor ordinances. Under the old employment regulation, temporary
contracts were practically non-existent provided their very restricted use.
Nevertheless, with the Moncloa Pacts of 1977, two major laws, the Workers’ Statute
(Estatuto de los Trabajadores, Law 8/1980 o f 10 March 1980) and the Basic
Employment Law (Ley Basica de Empleo, law 51/1980 o f 8 October 1980), helped
deregulate the use of temporary contracts by firms. Both laws relaxed and broadened
the set of circumstances under which temporary work relationships could be arranged
between workers and employers (EIRR, 1987).
The deregulation o f temporary employment was further extended in 1984, when
the Workers’ Statute from 1980 was revised with the hope of curbing the increasing
unemployment rate. The Law 32/84 o f 2 August 1984 introduced an element of
flexibility into the Spanish labor market by enhancing the opportunities for part-time
working, part-time work/partial retirement options through the so-called “relief
contracts”, and by widening the variety o f temporary contracts with the addition of
fixed-term contracts. The new contractual arrangements were successful at increasing
temporary employment and labor market flexibility. However, employment flexibility
only rose at the margin, that is, leaving the regulation of the already existing
permanent contracts intact.
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By 1993, and after the 1991-1992 economic recession, the government was
ready to discuss a reform o f the labor market institutions in order to combat the high
unemployment rate. A Decree-law on “urgent measures to promote employment” and
a bill on amendments to the 1980 Workers’ Statute were unilaterally approved by the
government (EIRR, 1994).
The Decree-law on urgent measures allowed for:
1. Temporary work agencies, previously illegal, ending the Government’s
monopoly on job placements.
2. New part-time jobs and apprenticeship contracts, which reduced the
duration of the old practical work contracts from three to two years. In addition, for
the latter work arrangements, workers’ wages were lowered from their full collectively
agreed rates to 60 and 75 percent of it during the first and second years respectively.
3. Other employment promotion measures, such as an extension of the duration
o f fixed-term contracts expiring in 1994 by one and a half years.
The bill on amendments to the Workers’ Statute, on the other hand, provided
employers with much more flexibility in terms of dismissals, functional and
geographical mobility of workers and in their proceedings to solve collective
redundancies. It also favored more flexible work schedules and abolished the overtime
and overnight wage premiums.
Following these measures, temporary employment agencies quickly developed.
About 250 agencies, concluding about half a million contracts a year, operated by
November 1995. Approximately 209,113 apprenticeship contracts were signed during
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1994, and about 36,318 during the months of June and July 1995 (EIRR, 1995). A
more flexible contractual regulation and the economic recovery from the 1992-1993
recession helped reduce the unemployment rate during 1995 and 1996.
The deregulation o f temporary contracts should help us to better understand
how the legal framework has shaped temporary employment’s outstanding growth. I
now examine the current regulation o f various types o f temporary contracts, followed
by the latest work arrangements introduced by the Royal Decrees Law 8 and 9 from
1997 to foment permanent employment and the transition from temporary to
permanent employment.
I can distinguish the following three groups o f temporary contracts:
(1) ordinary temporary contracts; (2) the so-called “employment creating contracts”,
containing fixed-term contracts as well as practice and training contracts for younger
workers; and (3) other contract varieties that allow for a temporary work relationship.
Ordinary temporary contracts include the following:
1.

Contracts for Specific Purposes (Contratos Para Obras o/y Servicios

Determinados): This contract was initially introduced by the Law o f Labor Relations
from 1976, and later on regulated in article 15 of the Workers’ Statute in 1980. The
reformed Workers’ Statute (Law 32/84) and Royal Decrees 2104/84, 2546/1994, and
8/1997 introduced some changes. In contrast with other temporary and fixed-term
contracts, the contract for specific purposes, designed with the intention that the
worker completes a specific task or project for the firm, has uncertain duration. The
contract expires upon completion o f the service contracted by the firm, but an
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advanced notice for dismissal o f 15 days is required when the contract duration
exceeds one year. If the contract is continued after completion o f the project, it
becomes open-ended.
2. Casual Employment Contracts (Contratos Eventuales): This temporary
contract was also introduced by the Law of Labor Relations and later on regulated by
the Workers’ Statute, Law 32/84 and Royal Decrees 2104/84, 2546/1994 and 8/97.
This particular contract is designed to meet unexpected changes in the firm’s routine,
such as an increase in export orders. Its maximum duration is six months within the
period of one year, after which the contract becomes open-ended. As for the contract
for specific purposes, article 8 from the RD 2546/1994 requires an advance notice of
layoff o f 15 days if the contract duration exceeds one year.
3. Temporary Work Contracts (Contratos de Interinidad): Temporary work
contracts were also introduced under the Law o f Labor Relations, and later on
regulated by the reformed Workers’ Statute and Royal Decrees 2104/84, 2546/1994
and 8/97. They are intended to fill a temporary vacancy created by a worker on leave.
The contract concludes once the worker is reinstated unless the substitute worker is
hired by the firm on a permanent basis. Finally, as in the case o f temporary contracts
for specific tasks, this contract may present an uncertain duration. However, no
advance notice of dismissal is required if the parties suppressed it from common
agreement, regardless of whether the contract duration exceeds one year.
4. New Launch Contracts (Contratos Para el Lanzamiento de una Nueva
Actividad): These contracts were introduced under the 1984 reform o f the Workers’
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Statute for those firms launching a new product, activity or opening a new filial. Their
duration oscillated between six months and three years with the possibility of one
renewal within the three years period. Once the maximum duration was exceeded, the
firm could only hire the employee on a permanent basis, as with most temporary
contracts. However, they have been eliminated by the RD 8/1997.
Several employment creating temporary contracts were especially promoted by
Royal Decrees since 1984, among which we find:
1.

Employment Creating Fixed-Term Contracts (Contratos Temporales Como

Medida de Fomento del Empleo): They originated from various Royal Decrees in 1981
and 1982 (RD 1363/81, RD 1445/82, RD 3887/82), and the Royal Decree 1989/84.
This contract cannot be concluded in any of the following instances: (a) when the
worker has been hired on a temporary basis by the firm during the last year, (b) when
the worker is hired for a position previously occupied by a temporary worker who
exhausted the maximum duration of the contract, or (c) if the company has collectively
dismissed workers during the last year. The minimum duration is six months and the
maximum three years. They can be renewed once up to the maximum contract
duration. In 1994, the duration of fixed-term contracts expiring during that year was
increased by one and a half years. The employee needs to be registered as unemployed
in the local employment office. The firm, on the other hand, is required to: (a) publicly
announce the new opening through the employment office, and (b) provide an advance
notice of dismissal and severance payment equivalent to 12 days of salary per year
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worked, still below the 20 days o f salary per year worked observed for permanent
workers.
2. Practical Work Contracts (Contratos en Practicas): These contracts are
currently regulated by the Royal Decrees 2317/93 and 8/97. They are intended to
provide workers with on the job training and paid employment. The contract duration,
originally limited to three years, can now only vary from six months to two years, with
the possibility o f two renewals as long as the two year maximum contract duration is
not exceeded. The contract may be completed on a part-time or full-time basis.
Employees must be registered as unemployed, they must have completed their studies
within the last four years, and acquired less than two years of training under a previous
practical contract. In addition, workers need to fulfill the job qualification
requirements and have no close family link with the firms’ CEOs. Practical work
employees enjoy social security benefits, however, their contract duration is not
counted towards pension entitlement.
The position must be offered publicly by the firm, which can pay 60 and 75
percent of the collectively bargained wage for a permanent worker occupying that
position during the first and second year of the contract, respectively, never falling
below the minimum wage. Employers also receive a 75 percent reduction in social
security taxes corresponding to full-time workers hired under practical work contracts.
3. Training Contracts (Contratos Para la Formation): They are regulated by
two Royal Decrees 2317/93 and 8/97, the latter reforming their previous regulation in
article 11 from the Workers’ Statute. The contract duration can oscillate between six
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months and three years. Prospective employees’ age must range between 16 and 21
years o f age and should have never been hired under training contracts for longer than
two years. Twenty-five to 50 percent o f the time must be dedicated to training, which
can either take place at the firm or at the training centers of the INEM (National
Institute for Employment). Theoretical instruction should, on the other hand, occupy
a minimum o f 15 percent o f the daily work schedule. Wages are negotiated with the
unions through collective bargaining, and for workers under eighteen it can be reduced
to 85 percent of the minimum wage.
Employers are exempted from social security taxes corresponding to workers
hired under the training contracts if their firm’s workforce is composed o f less than 25
employees and those under training contract are full-time workers. If the firm counts
with more than 25 employees, social security taxes corresponding to trained temporary
workers can be reduced by 90 percent. Finally, as in the case o f practical work
contracts, workers have the right to sickness and maternity benefits, work accidents
assistance, and other common contingencies; however, they have no right for future
pension entitlements.
In addition to fixed-term, training and practical work contracts, new
contractual work arrangements, such as group or common work contracts, home
working contracts and relief or early substitution contracts, also allow for a temporary
work relationship.
1.

Common Work Contracts (Contratos de Trabajo en Comun) and Group

Contracts (Contratos de Grupos): These contracts are regulated by the Royal Decree
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Law 1/1995. Employers can sign these contracts with a group o f workers with the
peculiarity that the employer maintains an independent work relationship with each of
them if it is a common work contract; otherwise the employer negotiates with the
group as a whole.
2. Home Working Contracts (Contratos a Domicilio): These contracts, initially
introduced by the Workers’ Statute in 1980, are currently regulated by the Royal
Decree Law 1/1995, article 13.
3. Relief Contracts (Contratos de Relevo) and Early Retirement-Substitution
Contract (Contrato de Sustitucion por Anticipation de la Edad de Jubilation): Relief
contracts are regulated in the Royal Decrees 1991/84 and 2317/93 and the Royal
Decree Law 8/97, while the early retirement-substitution contracts are regulated in the
Royal Decree 1194/85 and Royal Decree Law 8/97. Under relief contracts, a
temporary worker substitutes a worker on leave taking partial retirement, until the
latter completely retires. The worker on leave must be at least three years younger
than the age needed to retire, while the substitute only needs to be unemployed. The
employer is entitled to a 50 percent reduction in the social security taxes
corresponding to the temporary worker if he/she becomes a full-time permanent
employee once the worker on leave retires. Early retirement-substitution contracts
differ from the latter in their duration. In this case, the worker taking partial
retirement has to be only one year away from the retirement age. For both types of
contracts, however, the Royal Decree Law 8/97 provides employers with incentives to
convert them into permanent work arrangements.
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Summarizing, one of the distinguishing factors between the regulations for
temporary and permanent contracts are firing costs. Permanent workers’ dismissals
need to be accompanied by a written notice to the worker and the workers’
representative expressing the reasons for the dismissal. An advance notice of one, two
or three months depending on the job seniority, during which the employee has the
right to use up to six paid hours a week to look for another job, is also required.
Severance payments amount to 20 days per year of tenure with a maximum of 12
monthly payments. Nevertheless, these can be doubled if the worker believes the
dismissal was unfair, sues the employer, and Labor Courts decide in his favor, in which
case severance payments augment to 45 days per year o f tenure with a maximum of 42
monthly payments. Additionally, in the latter case, the employer would also have to
pay the wages and social security taxes corresponding to the time period between the
dismissal and the notification o f the judicial decision.
Temporary contracts, on the other hand, only require advance notice of layoff
and severance payments in limited cases and, in any event, lower than those for
permanent workers. Specifically, an advance notice o f dismissal of 15 days if the
contract duration exceeded one year is required for contracts for specific purposes,
casual employment contracts, and employment creating fixed-term contracts. A
severance payment of 12 days per year of tenure is observed only in the event of an
employment creating fixed-term contract.
Temporary workers cannot use up to six paid hours a week since the dismissal
was announced to search for a new job. Additionally, some temporary contracts, such
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as practical and training contracts, allow for reductions in social security taxes and
temporary workers’ wages. Finally, temporary workers cannot sue their employer for
a believed “unfair” dismissal. Therefore, the likelihood of possibly increasing
severance payments, along with the need to pay wages and social security taxes
corresponding to the period between the dismissal and the judicial decision
notification, are avoided.
During 1996, unions concerned with the large number of workers working on
temporary contracts called for a negotiated agreement to limit the extent o f temporary
employment by promoting the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent
contracts. Two new Royal Decrees-Law from 8/97 and 9/97 were approved in answer
to unions’ demands. The two Royal Decrees promote employment stability by
providing employers with social security savings ranging from 40 to 60 percent when
they convert old temporary contracts to permanent ones or when they hire workers
under any o f the newly introduced open-ended contractual arrangements. The new
contracts can be grouped according to the incentives they provide:
1.

Open-Ended Contracts and Temporary Contracts Transformed Into Open-

Ended Contracts With Reduction in the Severance Payment (Contratos de Trabajo por
Tiempo Indefinido y Transformation en Indefinidos de los Contratos Temporales, con
Reduction de la Indemnizacion por Despido): These contracts reduce severance
payments from 45 to 33 days-wage per year o f tenure in the event the dismissal is
found unfair.
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2. Open-Ended Contracts and Temporary Contracts Transformed Into OpenEnded Contracts With Incentives (Contratos de Trabajo por Tiempo Indefinido y
Transfomation en Indefinidos de los Contratos Temporales con Incentivos): These
contracts allow for a reduction between 40 and 60 percent o f the employer’s social
security contribution for common contingencies during the first year o f the contract,
among other incentives.
3. Open-Ended Contracts and Temporary Contracts Transformed Into OpenEnded Contracts With Severance Payment Reduction and Incentives (Contratos de
Trabajo por Tiempo Indefinido y Transformation en Indefinidos de los Contratos
Temporales con Reduction de la Indemnization por Despido y con Incentivos): They
combine reductions in severance payments and social security contributions. The new
Royal Decrees target disadvantaged labor groups, such as unemployed youngsters,
unemployed workers registered as such for at least one year, unemployed workers at
least forty-five years o f age, and temporary workers, in particular those in training and
practical work contracts as well as relief contracts.
Nevertheless, the recent appearance o f these new open-ended contractual
arrangements does not allow for an evaluation o f their effects on temporary and
permanent employment yet. As future research, it would be interesting to examine
how the new labor legislation will affect workers’ transitions into and out of temporary
employment, temporary and permanent employment creation and destruction, and the
duration o f temporary employment itself.
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Conclusion

This chapter has discussed Spain’s recent economic trends, system o f industrial
relations and deregulation of temporary contracts to improve our understanding of the
outstanding growth o f temporary employment in this economy.
High unemployment rates, unions’ clout over wages and employment
measures affecting dismissal cost differences between temporary and permanent
contracts need to be jointly considered for a better understanding o f Spain’s temporary
employment growth. Since temporary employment was encouraged by public policy
to increase labor flexibility and promote employment growth, economic trends and
labor market institutions have much to do with the Spanish temporary employment and
employers’ hiring practices.
The following chapters provide a thorough analysis o f Spain’s temporary
employment from the worker or supply-side perspective as well as from the employer
or demand-side perspective. The analysis incorporates macroeconomic trends (such as
regional unemployment rates), institutional elements (such as the presence of collective
bargaining) and employment costs proxies for temporary and permanent workers (such
as the ratio of temporary to permanent work wages and a proxy for dismissal costs of
permanent workers). In addition, employers’ employment expectations and year
dummies are included to account for the importance of future increases in workload
and for structural changes due to legislative, institutional, political and economic
reforms.
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CHAPTER HI

WORK TRANSITIONS INTO AND OUT OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT: A
SUPPLY SIDE ANALYSIS OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

As previously discussed, the need for flexibility and modernization o f labor
market institutions and employment contracts after the Francoist regime led to the
passage of the Workers’ Statute (1980) and its 1984 reform. The latter introduced an
array of new flexible employment contracts whose main purpose was to increase
employment flexibility and to lower the high unemployment rate by promoting firms’
use of temporary workers, who were characterized by lower lay off and discharge
cost.
The rapid growth of temporary employment increased labor market flexibility
only at the margin, resulting in a dual labor market comprising an inner core of
permanent workers (insiders) and an external group o f unemployed individuals and
peripheral workers enduring worse working conditions and less opportunities of
advancement (outsiders). In the presence of a two-tier labor market, several issues
become relevant: who enters temporary employment? Is this a voluntary choice? Is
entrance into temporary employment dependent on the individual’s previous
employment history? Does temporary employment facilitate workers’ access to a
permanent or primary sector job, or does it constitute a trap for workers? What is the
likelihood that a temporary worker will become permanent and how does this
39
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likelihood change over time with increasing tenure? Are temporary workers more
likely to perpetuate their status or exit to permanent employment than other groups of
workers?
This chapter examines the effect that increased flexibility through the extensive
use o f temporary contracts had on workers’ transitions into and out o f temporary
employment as well as the supply side determinants behind such transitions. To
address these issues, the chapter is organized as follows. A descriptive statistical
analysis o f the incidence of temporary employment in Spain, its involuntary character,
and job transition rates in the economy precedes the analysis of temporary work
transitions.
Job transitions patterns into temporary employment, as well as to other labor
force statuses, are explored using a multinomial logit model that uncovers the effect of
individuals’ previous work history, personal and job characteristics on their likelihood
to obtain a temporary versus a permanent employment status. In general, the
multinomial logit allows for the comparison of transition patterns across various
working age groups, such as temporary, unemployed, non-salaried workers and out of
the labor force individuals.
Subsequently, workers’ exits from temporary employment into various labor
force statuses are analyzed. My attention focuses upon the fact of whether temporary
employment operates as a vehicle from unemployment and non-participation into
permanent employment or, on the contrary, it becomes a workstyle for temporary
workers, as dual labor market theory contends. A competing risks hazard model is
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utilized to examine: (a) which workers’ personal and job characteristics influence their
job mobility patterns, in particular to a permanent job versus a new temporary job, and
(b) how temporary workers’ likelihood of exiting to a specific labor force status varies
with different temporary work tenures. Lastly, a final summary of the main results
emerging from the analysis is provided.

Temporary Employment’s Incidence and Labor Market Transition Patterns

The Data

To ascertain the incidence o f temporary employment in Spain and examine
workers’ transition patterns, micro level data is needed. The data used is drawn from
the Spanish labor force survey (Encuesta de Poblacion Activa, from now on: EPA)
carried out by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). The survey is carried
out every quarter on a sample o f approximately 64,000 households. The survey is
designed to be representative o f the working age Spanish population, and the
questionnaire contains a series o f questions regarding gender, age, education,
occupation, activity, and employment histories. No information on wages is included
in the survey, however. The sample is selected to be representative o f the working age
population.
The study o f work transitions is possible thanks to the panel structure of the
EPA. One sixth of the interviewed households leaves the sample every quarter.
Therefore, it is possible to follow each household over a total of she quarters.
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Nevertheless, according to the INE, when linking individuals over six quarters, the
final sample is considerably reduced and does not remain representative o f the overall
working age population present in the quarterly surveys. Consequently, following the
INE’s recommendations, I link individuals over a maximum o f five quarters to keep
the sample as representative o f the overall population.
In this paper I use matched and unmatched files. Unmatched EPA files on
salaried workers running from 1995:3 to 1996:2 are used in the descriptive analysis to
examine the nature and incidence o f temporary employment.
The analysis o f workers’ transition rates, however, requires exploiting the
longitudinal nature of the sample, matching the EPA files over five consecutive
quarters. In particular, for the analysis of workers’ transitions into temporary
employment and other labor force statuses, I used matched EPA files from 1995:2 to
1996:2. The resulting sample contains 37,899 observations from all working age
individuals regardless o f their work status. The sample size is reduced as I examine
temporary workers’ exit to various labor force statuses, including permanent
employment. Specifically, a sample of 6,497 observations results as I focus on those
individuals continuously surveyed from 1995:2 through 1996:2, conditional on their
temporary status in the origin year.6

The Incidence of Temporary Employment

The Encuesta de Poblacion Activa (INE, 1995, p. 165) defines temporary
employment as:
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...salaried employment where the contract end date is objectively determined
by specific conditions, such as the expiration o f a time period, the completion
o f a specific task, the return of certain employees the temporary workers were
filling in for, completion of the work load left unfinished by the retirees, etc.
The survey asks whether the labor contract is open-ended or temporary. In the
latter case, individuals are questioned on the specific type o f temporary contract they
hold, such as: practical or training contracts, seasonal work, probationary contract,
filling in for a worker on leave, contracts for specific purposes or tasks, or any other
contract, such as employment promoting temporary contracts.
Table 3 displays the annual average incidence and distribution of temporary
contracts in Spain using four different quarters extending from 1995:3 to 1996:2.
Temporary employment amounts to approximately 30 percent of the labor force. This
proportion exceeds by far the averages for most European countries and the United
States, both ranging between 2 and 17 percent (Meulders, Plasman and Plasman,
1994).
Although most temporary workers are male, a larger percentage o f working
women holds temporary contracts. In addition, younger workers appear more likely
to be employed through temporary contracts than their older counterparts. Indeed, as
shown in Table 4, temporary workers are 29 years old on average, 10 years younger
than permanent workers. Thirty-nine percent of illiterate salaried workers hold a
temporary job. Nevertheless, forty percent of temporary workers have completed
secondary studies and approximately 29 percent received vocational training or a
university education. Thus, temporary employment is not limited to less educated
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Table 3
Annual Average Incidence and Distribution of Temporary Contracts
by Worker Characteristics

Characteristics

Total

Incidence

Percentage of
Temporary Workers

30.4

100.0

Personal characteristics
Males

29.6

59.0

Females

36.6

41.0

16-19 Years old

85.8

6.9

20-24 Years old

72.8

23.8

25-29 Years old

51.5

21.5

30-34 Years old

32.8

13.9

35-39 Years old

24.0

10.2

40-44 Years old

20.9

7.6

45-49 Years old

17.7

5.8

50-54 Years old

16.2

4.1

55-59 Years old

13.5

2.2

60-64 Years old

12.0

1.1

65 Years or older

10.7

2.9

Single

39.4

60.8

Married

22.5

39.2
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Table 3—Continued

Characteristics

Incidence

Percentage of
Temporary Workers

Illiterate

39.1

7.6

Primary studies

32.4

23.5

Secondary studies

39.1

40.1

Vocational training

37.4

14.9

University

22.0

13.9

Industry
Agriculture

55.5

7.3

Textile, leather, food, paper,
wood

36.4

11.1

Extractive industries,
petroleum refinery, mining,
chemicals, energy and water

25.3

6.1

Engineering and electric
equipment, and various
manufacturing industries

11.5

4.9

Construction

60.3

16.4

Trade and hotels

40.1

21.9

Transportation

24.0

4.5

Financial institutions

30.6

8.0

Public administration,
education and health

18.9

12.1
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Table 3—Continued

Characteristics

Other services

Incidence

Percentage of
Temporary Workers

36.8

7.7

Occupation
Managers and public
administrators

18.6

2.6

Scientific professionals

19.9

7.7

Professionals and
technicians

12.1

5.9

Administrative workers

23.9

8.9

Sales and service workers

39.0

16.6

Agriculture workers

32.2

1.9

Industrial and construction
workers

40.8

19.8

Equipment operators

32.4

10.3

Non-qualified workers

50.1

25.0

Army

21.4

1.3

Seasonal job
Continued activity

33.1

92.3

Seasonal

70.7

7.7
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Table 3—Continued

Characteristics

Incidence

Percentage of
Temporary Workers

Work arrangement
Full-time

30.9

78.5

Part-time

28.8

21.5

Type of Sector
Private

33.6

84.5

Public

20.2

15.5

Tenure
0-3 Months

90.6

46.3

4-6 Months

80.2

21.0

7-11 Months

71.6

11.0

1-4 Years

21.4

11.4

More Than 5 Years

6.7

10.3

Job search
Yes

75.3

6.7

No

32.4

91.3

Reason to be searching
Insecurity in present job

63.8

29.6

Viewing present job as
provisional

74.8

24.6
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Table 3—Continued

Incidence

Percentage of
Temporary Workers

Complementing present job

60.8

9.9

Improving working
conditions

65.6

22.7

Other reasons

67.1

13.3

Characteristics

Situation before searching for a job
Working

44.1

47.2

Studying

30.7

14.7

Military service

16.4

9.0

Home

16.4

5.9

Other

18.5

23.2

individuals.
In terms of industry and occupation, temporary work displays a higher
incidence in the agriculture and construction sectors, where 55 and 60 percent of their
employees hold temporary jobs respectively. Trade and hotels follow with 40 percent
o f their work force under temporary contracts. Since the service sector accounts for
most of the Spanish GNP, it is not surprising to find that 54 percent o f all temporary
workers employed in trade, hotels, transportation, public administration, education and
health, and other services. Additionally, the high incidence o f temporary
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Table 4
Annual Average Means for Permanent and Temporary Workers’ Jobs Characteristics

Characteristics

Temporary
Workers

Permanent
Workers

Age of Worker

29

39

Normal Weekly Hours

38

39

Weekly Duration of
Training

17

15

Tenure in the Job in
Months

26

155

Contract Duration in Days

377

-

employment in the service, construction and agriculture industries is partially explained
by the cyclical character of these industries’ services and labor demands.
As we would expect from the nature o f the contract, tenure is significantly
lower for temporary workers. Consequently, search patterns differ substantially
between temporary and permanent workers. Seventy-five percent of all workers
searching for a new job are temporary workers, their main reason being insecurity in
their jobs. Furthermore, 66 percent o f those individuals searching for a new job to
improve their working conditions are temporary workers. This result motivates a
debate on whether temporary jobs can be classified as “bad” jobs and, thus, whether
workers choose this type of jobs voluntarily.
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Voluntary Versus Involuntary Temporary Employment and Labor Market Transitions

Table 5 displays the distribution of temporary workers according to their type
o f contract and reasons for accepting a temporary job. The percentage o f temporary
workers holding a temporary job due to their inability to find a permanent job reaches
85 percent. In addition, only 0.4 percent admit to have been seeking a temporary job.
These statistics are indicative of the involuntary nature and demand-led character of
Spanish temporary employment.
Labor market transition rates for those individuals remaining in the sample
from the second quarter of 1995 to the second quarter of 1996 are shown in Table 6.
Worker's mobility can be ascertained from these figures. The percentage o f temporary
workers in 1995 who become permanent workers one year later is approximately 12
percent, while the percentage that remains temporarily employed reaches 62 percent.
This is a large proportion compared to Segal and Sullivan's (1995) transition rates for
the United States using CPS data from 1983 to 1993. In their analysis, less than one
third o f temporary workers were still on temporary work arrangements one year later,
compared to 62 percent in the Spanish case; and instead of just 12 percent moving into
permanent positions after one year, they find that more than half were working under
permanent contracts after that time period. The low pattern of labor mobility for
temporary workers in Spain is worrisome as it is indicative of a segmented labor
market with a secondary class of workers enduring less desirable working conditions
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Table 5
Annual Average Frequency of Temporary Employment by Type o f Contract and
Motive for Becoming a Fixed-Term Worker

Percentage of
Temporary Contracts

Variable Name
Type of Contract
Training and Practical Work

4.4

Casual Employment and Seasonal Contracts

7.9

Probationary Contracts

4.1

Temporary Work Contracts to Fill up a Vacancy

5.3

Contract for Specific Purposes

15.8

Other (i.e. Employment Creating Fixed Term Contracts)

62.5

Motive for Becoming a Fixed-Term Worker
Have Not Found a Permanent Job

85.3

Did Not Want a Permanent Job

0.4

Other

8.0

Does Not Know

6.3

than their permanent colleagues. In addition, more than 17 percent of temporary
workers become unemployed a year later instead o f the 4.9 percent for the United
States (Segal and Sullivan, 1995). As a result, Spanish temporary workers share a
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Table 6
Labor Market Transition Rates (Percent)

Labor Force Status in 1996:2

Labor Force
Status1995:2

Unemployed

Permanent
Worker

Temporary
Worker

Other
Occupation

88.00
90.00

5.88
17.61

1.47
2.44

3.13
10.47

1.52
5.29

Unemployed

13.06
4.46

60.60
60.59

3.08
1.71

20.20
22.57

3.07
3.56

Permanent
Worker

3.67
2.24

2.81
5.04

88.74
88.34

2.79
5.58

1.99
4.14

Temporary
Worker

6.57
1.93

17.45
14.97

11.62
5.54

61.90
59.32

2.46
2.45

Other
Occupation

4.80
1.38

2.13
1.79

4.23
1.98

2.20
2.06

86.64
84.55

Row Pet/
Column Pet

Out of the
Labor
Force

Out of the
Labor
Force

higher degree of contingency and precariousness at the work place, along with lower
labor force attachment. Which factors determine the observed transition rates into and
out of temporary employment? The following sections provide a multivariate analysis
of workers’ job mobility patterns.
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Workers' Entrance Into Temporary Employment

I first examine workers' mobility patterns into temporary employment
controlling for their previous work history, personal and job characteristics. Segura et
al. (1991), Jimeno and Toharia (1994), and Alba-Ramirez (1996, 1997) have estimated
logit models to study the likelihood o f entering temporary employment given
individuals' current personal and job characteristics. Nevertheless, mobility between
contingent and non-contingent employment is limited in the presence o f a two-tier
labor market, and workers' previous employment status exerts a strong effect on their
future employment outcomes. Consequently, a multinomial logit o f the probability
that workers might enter temporary employment, or any other labor force status, such
as: temporary employment, permanent employment, unemployment, non-salaried work
or out of the labor force, given their previous, instead o f their current, work history
and personal characteristics is estimated.
The sample is constructed linking those individuals who stay in the sample
from the second quarter of 1995 to the second quarter o f 1996. The multinomial logit
uses the labor force status of the interviewed individual in 1996 (LFS96) as the
dependent variable. LFS96 can take five different values: LFS96=1 if out of the labor
force, LFS96=2 if unemployed, LFS96=3 if permanently employed, LFS96=4 if
temporarily employed, and LFS96=5 if the person holds a non-salaried job. The
probability of temporary employment, as well as any other work or non-work status, in
1996 is modeled as a function o f the worker's employment history and previous
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personal, job and search-behavior characteristics. Consequently, all independent
variables have 1995 values. Using all the sample o f individuals who stayed in the
survey from 1995:2 to 1996:2, a multinomial logit is estimated with the permanent
work outcome for 1996:2 as the reference category. Alba-Ramirez (1997) examined
the exit patterns o f temporary workers to various labor force statuses using a
multinomial logit. Nonetheless, the analysis does not examine the entrance into
temporary employment and, by limiting the original sample to only temporary workers,
does not allow for a comparative analysis o f work transitions patterns across groups of
workers.
The covariates in the multinomial logit model are described in Table 7. Their
means and standard deviation are reported in Table B1 in Appendix B. To learn about
the effect that a particular labor status combined with a specific educational level or
industry might have on the individual’s likelihood to sign a temporary contract or enter
in any other labor force status, a series of interaction terms are incorporated into the
multinomial logit regression. To test their significance a LR test is conducted using
the reported unconstrained model against a constrained version excluding such
interaction terms. The test results in Table 8 indicate that an unconstrained model
should be estimated.
In addition, Table 8 displays the coefficients and their standard errors from the
multinomial logit regression o f the unconstrained model. Underneath the standard
errors o f the coefficients, I report the probability or odds ratios.7 The latter are given
by the exponentiated value of the estimated coefficients in the multinomial logit
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Table 7
Summary of Variables
Variable Name

Description

Measurement

Dependent Variable
LFS96

Log odds that an individual
belongs to a particular
labor force status in 1996
relative to another labor
force status of reference

l=Out of the labor force
2=Unemployed
3=Permanently employed
4=Temporarily employed
5=Non-salaried worker

Independent Variables
Unemployed-95

Unemployed in 1995.

Dummy variable

Out of the LF-95

Out of the labor force in
1995.

Dummy variable

Temporary-95

Salaried and temporary
worker in 1995.

Dummy variable

Permanent-95

Salaried and permanent
worker in 1995.

Dummy variable

Other Occupation-95

Non-salaried worker in
1995.

Dummy variable

Gender

Dummy variable

Sixteen to 19 years old,

Dummy variables

Relationship with the
household.

Dummy variables

Personal Characteristics
Female
Age 16, age20,

age60

Main Person=household
Partner=household’s
partner,
Son=household’s child,
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Table 7—Continued
Variable Name

Description

Measurement

Married

Marital status

Dummy variable

Primary Studies,
Secondary Studies, and
Higher Education=
professional or university
studies.

Education

Dummy variables

Temp-primary= temporary
worker with primary
education,
Temp-secondary=
temporary worker with
secondary education,
Temp-higher= temporary
Worker with higher
education.
Education interaction
terms are similarly created
for the other four possible
labor force status in 1995.

Interaction terms created
between previous labor
force status and education.

Interaction terms created
for each of the five labor
force status and the three
education categories.

Industry they worked in if
employed in 1995 or home
if the individual did not
work in 1995.

Dummy variables for each
industry category.

Other Person=any other
person in the house.

Job Characteristics
Agriculture,
Industry=manufacturing
and extractive industries,
Construction,
Services=trade and
hotels, financial
institutions,
Education & health &
public administration, and
other services,
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Table 7—Continued
Variable Name

Description

Measurement

Temp-sector= temporary
worker hired in that
particular sector,
Perm-sector= permanent
Worker hired in that
sector.
Occupation Other-sector=
Self-employed, working in
that particular sector.

Interaction terms created
between previous working
status and industry
categories.

Interaction terms created
between previous working
status and industry
categories.

Managers, Technicians &
Professionals,
Administrative Workers,
Sales and Services,
Agriculture,
Manufacturing and
Construction, Non
qualified.

Occupation if they worked
in 1995, or home-workers
if they did not work in
1995.

Dummy variables for each
occupation category.

Seasonal

Seasonal nature o f the job.

Dummy variable

Full-time

Working time
arrangement.

Dummy variable

Public

Sector they work in.

Dummy variable

Tenure

Tenure in months.

Total of months working.

Tenure Square

Tenure in months squared.

Working months squared.

Employment Office &
Subsidy,
Employment Office & No
Subsidy,
Unregistered in the
Employment Office.

Registration in the official
employment office and
reception of unemployment
subsidy.

Dummy variables
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Table 7—Continued
Variable Name

Description

Measurement

Search

Whether the individual is
searching for a job.

Dummy variable

model. Probability ratios capture the likelihood of a given outcome relative to the
base outcome, which is permanent employment in the present model, when there is a
one unit change in the corresponding variable. A regressor that reduces the likelihood
of a given labor force status in 1996 relative to permanent employment has a
probability or odds ratio less than one. Whereas, a regressor that raises the probability
of a given outcome relative to the permanent employment outcome has a probability
or odds ratio greater than one.
The purpose of this research is to identify the factors explaining the likelihood
of different groups of workers of moving into temporary employment, as well as those
behind temporary workers’ likelihood to move out o f temporary employment, in a one
year interval. Therefore, I will examine the specified transitions and discuss the
findings concerning other transition patterns when they are relevant for the problem at
hand.
Temporary employees are more likely to be temporarily than permanently
employed a year later, either because they are still in their initial temporary job or
because they rotated from one temporary job to another. In the next section, however,
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Table 8
Multinomial Logit Coefficients o f the Probability o f Workers’ Job Transitions
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
[Probability Ratios]

Employment Status in 1996
Out o f Labor
Force

Unemployed

Temporary

Other
Occupation

Unemployed-95

4.776***
(0.278)
[118.633]

3.688***
(0.243)
[39.955]

3.391***
(0.248)
[29.704]

3.699***
(0.312)
[40.390]

Out of the LF-95

6.532***
(0.205)
[686.484]

3.238***
(0.198)
[25.475]

2.805***
(0.201)
[16.525]

3.089***
(0.237)
[29.946]

Temporary-95

2.304***
(0.197)
[10.012]

2.359***
(0.165)
[10.577]

3.729***
(0.156)
[41.619]

1.848***
(0.230)
[6.350]

Other Occupation95

3.053***
(0.251)
[21.174]

2.276***
(0.272)
[9.736]

2.530***
(0.266)
[12.553]

6.075***
(0.197)
[435.061]

Female

0.385***
(0.081)
[1.470]

0.390***
(0.080)
[1.477]

0.003***
(0.079)
[1.003]

-0.268***
(0.104)
[0.765]

Age 16

1.115***
(0.162)
[3.051]

0.540***
(0.164)
[1.716]

0.618***
(0.164)
[1.856]

0.594***
(0.214)
[1.811]

Age25

-0.523***
(0.116)
[0.593]

-0.295***
(0.105)
[0.745]

-0.322***
(0.102)
[0.724]

0.039
(0.150)
[1.039]

Covariates
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Table 8-Continued

Employment Status in 1996
Out o f Labor
Force

Unemployed

Temporary

Other
Occupation

Age30

-0.365***
(0.129)
[0.694]

-0.198*
(0.119)
[0.820]

-0.416***
(0.116)
[0.660]

0.286*
(0.161)
[1.332]

Age35

-0.402***
(0.138)
[0.669]

-0.312**
(0.129)
[0.732]

-0.538***
(0.126)
[0.584]

0.270
(0.169)
[1.310]

Age40

-0.470***
(0.145)
[0.625]

-0.490***
(0.139)
[0.613]

-0.773***
(0.138)
[0.462]

0.019
(0.178)
[1.020]

Age45

-0.132
(0.149)
[0.876]

-0.558***
(0.146)
[0.572]

-0.762***
(0.145)
[0.467]

0.266
(0.182)
[1.305]

Age50

0.298*
(0.158)
[1.347]

-0.337**
(0.159)
[0.714]

-0.926***
(0.164)
[0.396]

0.316
(0.194)
[1.371]

Age55

0.906***
(0.165)
[2.474]

-0.485***
(0.176)
[0.616]

-1.006***
(0.185)
[0.366]

0.335
(0.206)
[1.397]

Age60

2.041***
(0.175)
[7.695]

-0.793***
(0.25)
[0.452]

-0.966***
(0.228)
[0.381]

0.774***
(0.221)
[2.168]

Main Person

-0.360***
(0.125)
[0.698]

-0.430***
(0.121)
[0.651]

-0.122
(0.120)
[0.885]

-0.283*
(0.147)
[1.753]

Covariates

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
Table 8-Continued

Employment Status in 1996

Unemployed

Temporary

Other
Occupation

(0.148)
[1.828]

-0.273*
(0.147)
[0.761]

-0.249*
(0.148)
[0.779]

0.006
(0.181)
[1.006]

Other Person

-0.124
(0.158)
[0.883]

-0.285*
(0.157)
[0.752]

-0.179
(0.154)
[0.836]

-0.067
(0.192)
[0.935]

Married

-0.073
(0.110)
[0.930]

-0.017
(0.230)
[0.983]

0.008
(0.110)
[1.008]

0.105
(0.129)
[1.911]

Primary Studies

0.315**
(0.154)
[1.371]

0.118
(0.155)
[1.126]

0.201
(0.159)
[1.222]

-0.192
(0.175)
[0.825]

Higher Education

-0.129
(0.184)
[0.879]

-0.667***
(0.182)
[0.513]

-0.223
(0.166)
[0.800]

-0.381**
(0.189)
[0.683]

UnemployedPrimary Studies

0.286
(0.263)
[1.331]

0.611**
(0.251)
[1.842]

0.139
(0.262)
[1.150]

0.583*
(0.309)
[1.792]

UnemployedHigher Education

0.270
(0.295)
[1.310]

0.581**
(0.279)
[1.788]

0.379
(0.275)
[1.461]

0.330
(0.344)
[1.390]

Out of the LFPrimary Studies

-0.367*
(0.219)
[0.693]

-0.093
(0.232)
[0.911]

-0.230
(0.248)
[0.795]

0.440
(0.276)
[1.553]

Covariates
Partner

Out o f Labor
Force

0.603***
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Table 8-Continued

Employment Status in 1996
Out o f Labor
Force

Unemployed

Temporary

Other
Occupation

Out of the LFHigher Education

-0.076
(0.286)
[0.927]

1.249***
(0.294)
[3.486]

0.602**
(0.297)
[1.825]

0.601*
(0.350)
[1.823]

Temp-Primary
Studies

-0.291
(0.232)
[0.747]

0.324**
(0.207)
[1.383]

0.184
(0.198)
[1.203]

0.671**
(0.285)
[1.956]

Temp-Higher
Education

-0.115
(0.271)
[0.891]

0.538
(0.229)
[1.712]

0.140
(0.201)
[1.151]

0.004
(0.339)
[1.004]

Other OccupationPrimary Studies

-0.254
(0.284)
[0.776]

0.151
(0.328)
[1.163]

0.146
(0.322)
[1.157]

0.327
(0.244)
[1.386]

Other OccupationHigher Education

-0.654*
(0.392)
[0.520]

0.304
(0.391)
[1.355]

0.215
(0.356)
[1.240]

0.178
(0.273)
[1.195]

Agriculture

0.649**
(0.317)
[1.914]

0.899***
(0.316)
[2.458]

1.366***
(0.273)
[3.921]

0.866**
(0.342)
[2.376]

Industry

0.053
(0.156)
[1.055]

0.140
(0.174)
[1.151]

0.026
(0.171)
[1.026]

-0.211
(0.189)
[0.810]

Construction

0.008
(0.291)
[1.008]

0.947***
(0.237)
[2.579]

0.868***
(0.226)
[2.383]

0.562**
(0.268)
[1.755]

Covariates
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Table 8-Continued

Employment Status in 1996
Out of Labor
Force

Unemployed

Temporary

Other
Occupation

Temp-Agriculture

0.462
(0.441)
[1.588]

-0.274
(0.403)
[0.760]

-0.756**
(0.360)
[0.470]

-0.387
(0.506)
[0.679]

Temp-Industry

-0.200
(0.247)
[0.818]

-0.243
(0.222)
[0.784]

-0.132
(0.204)
[0.877]

-0.349
(0.332)
[0.705]

TempConstruction

0.592
(0.368)
[1.807]

0.120
(0.289)
[1.127]

-0.170
(0.271)
[0.843]

-0.494
(0.392)
[0.610]

Other OccupationAgriculture

0.023
(0.449)
[1.023]

-1.089**
(0.539)
[0.337]

-0.435
(0.457)
[0.648]

-0.024
(0.411)
[0.977]

Other OccupationIndustry

-0.152
(0.339)
[0.859]

-0.311
(0.425)
[0.733]

-0.413
(0.422)
[0.662]

0.002
(0.278)
[1.002]

Other OccupationConstruction

-0.029
(0.474)
[0.971]

-0.537
(0.452)
[0.585]

-0.792*
(0.439)
[0.453]

-0.647*
(0.354)
[0.524]

Managers and
Public
Administrators

0.466**
(0.207)
[1.593]

0.611***
(0.230)
[1.842]

0.299
(0.228)
[1.349]

0.706***
(0.169)
[2.025]

Technicians &
Professionals

-0.482***
(0.172)
[0.618]

-0.126
(0.150)
[0.882]

0.036
(0.127)
[1.036]

-0.237
(0.155)
[0.789]

Covariates
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Table 8-Continued

Employment Status in 1996

Out of Labor
Force

Unemployed

Temporary

Other
Occupation

-0.442**
(0.182)
[0.643]

-0.620***
(0.173)
[0.538]

-0.146
(0.138)
[0.864]

-0.557***
(0.193)
[0.573]

Agriculture
Workers

-0.142
(0.328)
[0.867]

0.245
(0.305)
[1.278]

-0.115
(0.266)
[0.891]

0.185
(0.316)
[1.204]

Manufacture &
Construction Wks.

0.074
(0.151)
[1.077]

0.048
(0.141)
[1.050]

0.124
(0.121)
[1.132]

-0.008
(0.144)
[0.992]

Non-qualified
Workers

0.090
(0.139)
[1.094]

0.062
(0.131)
[1.064]

0.103
(0.116)
[1.109]

-0.107
(0.158)
[0.898]

Tenure

-0.007***
(0.001)
[0.993]

-0.013***
(0.001)
[0.987]

-0.015***
(0.001)
[0.985]

-0.004***
(0.001)
[0.996]

Tenure Squared

1.5e-05***
(2.3e-06)
[1.000]

2.4e-05***
(3.7e-06)
[1.000]

2.7e-05***
(3.6e-06)
[1.000]

9.2e-06***
(2.4e-06)
[1.000]

Emp. Office &
Subsidy

-0.976***
(0.174)
[0.377]

0.477***
(0.170)
[1.611]

0.549***
(0.177)
[1.732]

-0.433*
(0.225)
[0.649]

Emp. Office &
No-Subsidy

-0.526***
(0.135)
[0.591]

0.606***
(0.132)
[1.833]

0.416***
(0.137)
[1.515]

-0.262
(0.176)
[0.770]

Covariates
Administrative
Workers
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Table 8-Continued

Employment Status in 1996

Covariates
Search

Out of Labor
Force

Unemployed

Temporary

Other
Occupation

-0.176
(0.184)
[0.838]

0.761***
(0.162)
[2.141]

0.237
(0.161)
[1.267]

-0.278
(0.222)
[0.757]

Predicted Probability o f Each Outcome
Permanent
Employment

Out of Labor
Force

Unemployed

Temporary
Employment

Other
Occupation

0.1591

0.4618

0.1613

0.1202

0.0977

Regression Fit Statistics
N = 37899

Mlogit: LR test

Chi Square (192) =
64730.26

Prob > Chi Square =
0.000
Chi2(56) = 146.39

Pseudo R2 = 0.5758

Prob > Chi2 = 0.000

Note: The following variables are used as reference: permanent worker in 1995,
age20, household’s son, secondary education, trade/hotels as activity and
sales/services workers as occupation. An intercept is also being included.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.

the analysis o f temporary workers’ exits to various labor force statuses allows us to
evaluate temporary workers’ likelihood to perpetuate their temporary work status by
transiting to a new temporary job. In any event, the relative risk of being temporarily
versus permanently employed a year later is 41.619 for temporary workers relative to
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permanent workers. Out o f the workforce respondents, unemployed and non-salaried
workers are also more likely to be working on a temporary than on a permanent basis
a year later. In particular, they are 12.5, 30 and 16.5 times more likely than their
permanent counterparts to become temporary workers, respectively.
Comparing across groups of workers, temporary workers, followed by
unemployed and out of the workforce individuals, are the most likely to be working on
a temporary basis a year later. Non-salaried workers, such as self-employed
individuals, are the least likely o f all four groups to be working on a temporary job a
year later. However, their risk o f being temporarily versus permanently employed a
year later is still 6.35 times greater than for permanent workers.
Ruiz-Quintanilla and Claes (1996) obtain similar results estimating a probit
model for the probability of becoming employed temporarily using data for all working
age individuals from some of the EC members. In their study, temporary employment
is perpetuated for most temporary employees. In addition, they also find temporary
employment to be a likely outcome for most unemployed and out of the labor force
individuals, who rely on temporary employment as a means to reenter and enter the
labor force respectively.
Female workers display a higher likelihood to work on a temporary job than on
a permanent one relative to male workers. These results also support Ruiz-Quintanilla
and Claes (1996) findings, according to which women appear more likely to hold
temporary jobs. The flexible work environment associated to the latter may appeal to
women wishing to combine family and work responsibilities.
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Young workers are the most likely to hold temporary jobs. In particular,
workers aged 16 to 19 years old are more likely than workers 20 to 24 years old to be
working on a temporary versus a permanent job a year later. Nonetheless, teenagers
are even more likely to still be at school as proven by their relative risk of being out of
the workforce versus permanently employed which reaches 3.051, while their risk of
being working on a temporary versus a permanent basis is 1.856.
Workers aged 20 to 24 years old is the next group to most likely be holding
temporary jobs a year later. This finding might be explained by the fact that most
individuals pursuing university degrees complete their studies within this age range and
enter the labor market through a temporary work arrangement. This observation is
confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient on out of the labor force
individuals with a higher education, who appear more likely to get a temporary job
than a permanent one a year later.
Lastly, the likelihood of holding a temporary job versus a permanent job
decreases steadily with age until retirement. Consequently, Spanish temporary
employment seems to be mostly circumscribed to younger workers.
The household’s partner, commonly the wife, appears less likely to become a
temporary worker than a permanent one, as well as more likely to stay out o f the labor
force. The former result may be possibly due to the existence o f family
responsibilities, such as children, which increase the partner’s reservation wage and
lowers her/his likelihood of being in the labor force versus out of the labor force. In
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addition, the latter finding supports the traditionally low female labor force
participation in Spain.
Educational attainment displays, in general, a significant influence on future
employment patterns. In general, more educated individuals are less likely than
workers with a high school education to become unemployed. However, out o f the
labor force workers with a university degree are more likely to be unemployed or, in
the event o f being employed, to be working on a temporary than on a permanent basis.
This result is capturing the school to work transition o f most university students, who
experience a period of unemployment frequently followed by a temporary job
assignment. Temporary employment is thus often used as a vehicle to enter the
working population. Other groups o f workers, such as temporary workers with a
primary education, are also more likely to exit to unemployment than permanent
workers and workers with a high school education (category of reference).
Industry-wise, individuals previously working in the agriculture or construction
industries share higher probabilities o f becoming temporarily, rather than permanently,
employed. This result might be explained by the fact that workers in these industries
develop specific skills difficult to adapt to other occupations. Consequently, they are
more likely to become temporary workers in the future to accommodate these
industries’ cyclical demands. The cyclical character of these industries’ demands may
also explain the fact that respondents previously employed in the agriculture and
construction industries are 2.5 times more likely than those working in the service
sector to be unemployed a year later.
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While previous employment in agriculture versus service industry (whether it is
temporary, permanent or non-salaried employment) as well as previous temporary
versus permanent employment (regardless o f industry) positively affect the likelihood
o f future temporary employment, temporary work in the agriculture industry does not.
A potential explanation for this finding may be the different groups of workers being
compared in the first two cases and in the latter case. In the previous cases, we are
comparing all workers in the agriculture sector to their counterparts in the service
industry, regardless o f type of contract; as well as all temporary workers to permanent
workers, regardless o f their industry. The new comparison group, however, is
restricted to temporary workers in the agriculture sector, who are compared to all
other permanent and/or service workers. It may be the case that the positive link
between employment in the agriculture industry and future temporary employment is
driven by the inclusion of permanent as well as non-salaried agriculture workers. They
may be both more likely to work on a temporary basis in the future to accommodate
the industry’s seasonal demand relative to their counterparts in the service industry.
Similarly, the direct relationship between temporary work and future temporary
employment may be primarily driven by the presence o f other temporary workers, such
as temporary workers in the service or manufacturing industry. In particular, since the
present model estimates the likelihood o f being temporarily employed a year later,
either in a new or in the same temporary job, temporary workers with shorter-lived
contracts may appear less likely to be temporarily employed a year later than their
temporary counterparts with longer-lived contracts. The latter may help explain why
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temporary workers in the agriculture industry share a lower likelihood o f becoming
temporarily employed a year later than temporary workers in the service industry, one
o f the groups of workers entering the category of reference. Indeed, during the period
of time being examined, only 17.5 percent of all temporary contracts in the agriculture
sector had a duration o f at least 12 months relative to 44.4 percent in the service
industry (author’s tabulations using the EPA).
In terms o f occupation, managers and public administrators display a higher
probability of exiting the labor force, becoming unemployed or opt to be selfemployed and exploit their managerial and directive skills. Administrative workers, on
the other hand, posses a variety o f skills easily adaptable to employers’ labor demands,
resulting in a lower likelihood o f exiting the workforce, becoming unemployed or selfemployed.
Tenure, thus greater labor force attachment, pays off by increasing the
likelihood of being permanently employed regardless o f the labor force outcome under
consideration. Finally, search strategies, such as registration in the official
employment office, are directly linked to the likelihood o f being temporarily employed,
versus permanently employed, a year later. This finding further suggests the use of
temporary employment by unemployed workers as a vehicle to enter the working
force.
Although the exit patterns o f temporary workers are researched in detail in the
following section, I will briefly exploit the information provided by the multinomial
logit’s coefficients and probability ratios on temporary workers’ exits to various labor
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force statuses. In particular, the positive and significant coefficients for temporary
workers’ exits to every outcome considered in the model reveals the inefficacy of
temporary employment as a means o f transiting to a permanent job a year later. Exits
from temporary employment to any other status under consideration are always, at
least 6.35 times, more likely than exits to a permanent job. In particular, the risk of
holding a temporary job relative to a permanent job a year later is the highest for
temporary workers, who appear 41.619 times more likely than their permanent
counterparts to perpetuate their status, by either continuing their old temporary job or
rotating to a new one. Furthermore, a comparison across groups of workers reveals
temporary workers are the least likely to exit the workforce or become non-salaried
workers. However, in both cases their likelihood of exiting the workforce or
becoming non-salaried workers is still 10 and 6 times greater than for permanent
workers, respectively. Finally, temporary employees are the second most likely to
become unemployed, with the exception of unemployed workers in the previous year,
one year later. In particular, their likelihood of becoming unemployed is 10 times that
o f permanent workers. The latter, in particular, reflects the frequent transitions from
employment to unemployment, and vice versa, temporary workers experience as a
result of short-lived contracts.
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Temporary Workers' Transitions to Permanent Employment and Multiple
Work/Non-Work Arrangements

The multinomial logit estimation results confirm the strong dependence of
temporary employment on the worker’s previous labor force status. In addition,
temporary workers appear likely to perpetuate their working status. The persistence
of temporary employment may carry serious social and welfare implications when
temporary employment is considered as a secondary type in a dual labor market
framework. Thus, it is important to investigate temporary workers' transition
probabilities into new temporary jobs versus permanent work arrangements, and
evaluate the effectiveness o f temporary employment in facilitating more secure and
stable employment.
Recently, Alba-Ramirez (1997) has looked at this issue estimating a
multinomial logit of the likelihood that a temporary worker might be found in any of
four alternative work/non-work arrangements a year later. His model, however,
differs from the analysis in the previous section as well as for the analysis to be
completed in the current section in various aspects. With respect to the analysis in the
previous section the following differences emerge. First, Alba-Ramirez’s (1997) study
is carried out using a sample of only temporary workers, which does not allow for the
analysis of transition patterns across groups of workers, as I have done. Secondly, his
study focuses only on the exit patterns o f temporary workers, not entry patterns.
With respect to the differences between his work and the analysis in the current
section, some additional differences can be underlined. First, his model does not track
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the individual's status over time. As a result, we cannot distinguish whether temporary
employment helped the individual to get permanent employment when other work
transitions occur within the two points in time under observation. More importantly,
the dynamics o f the likelihood of exiting to permanent employment or any other
working/non-working arrangement are not directly observable from the multinomial
logit results. However, according to search theory, temporary workers' likelihood o f
receiving a job offer for a new temporary or permanent position is sensitive to changes
in their tenure. One might think of long term unemployed workers confronting a more
difficult time to obtain a permanent job offer than a working individual. Consequently,
the analysis o f transition rates' dynamics can be o f interest.
This section uses Cox's proportional hazards model to examine workers' first
transition out o f temporary employment. The analysis enables us to identify when
temporary workers are more likely to rotate to new temporary jobs by plotting timepaths for the transition rates to each labor force status they might exit to.

A Competing Risks Hazards Model o f Temporary Workers' Transitions

Competing risks hazards models allow us to examine temporary workers'
likelihood of exiting temporary employment and entering: (a) permanent employment,
(b) non-salaried employment, (c) a new temporary job, (d) unemployment, or (e)
withdrawing from the labor force. Hazard models examine the likelihood of an event
as a function o f the duration for the failure to occur and other controls. Nevertheless,
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they can do so with less parametric assumptions than logit and probit models through
the estimation of a non-parametric model.
The event in hazard models is often called failure, and the duration for the
failure to occur is the random variable, represented by T. The hazard rates measure
the instantaneous rate o f failure conditioned on the fact that survival occurred until
time t, or:

(1)

X(t) = f(t)/S(t)

where f(t) represents the density function and S(t) is the survival function given by:

(2)

S(t) = l-F(t)

which yields the probability o f survival until time period t.
Hazard models often incorporate censoring, which takes place when some
individuals are not observed during the entire time to failure. In our case, the data is
right censored and, therefore, we do not observe the failure for some individuals in the
sample. A dummy variable:
di = 1 if spell is complete
0 if spell is censored
is created to account for censoring in the data.
We use a hazard model with five types o f failures, also called a competing risks
hazard model, to examine those factors determining the worker's decision to exit
temporary employment and enter any of the five labor statuses in consideration. The
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competing risks model treats secondary types of failures as censored spells with
respect to the primary type of failure whose hazard is being estimated. For example,
when estimating the hazard of exiting temporary employment to a permanent job, exits
to unemployment, non-salaried work, a new temporary job or simply out o f the
workforce are treated as censored. This approach assumes that censoring is noninformative beyond the information available in the covariates.
Following Cox (1984), suppose that each one o f the n temporary workers in
our sample can face five different types of failure indicated by v = v l,... v5. For each
one of these individuals we have collected the following observations: (tj, v;; zi) where
Zi is a vector of covariates and ti the temporary employment tenure for the ith
individual, where i=l,...n. The hazard rates are then estimated by maximizing the
following log likelihood function for each type of transition:

(3 )

I v £ i [djv*log K ( U , zj, PO] + Z vI, [lo g Sv(t;, Zj, Pi)]

where div=l for the failure type whose hazard is being computed or div= 0 otherwise.
Therefore, censored individuals only contribute to the log likelihood function a factor
S for each type of failure unobserved, while uncensored individuals, in addition,
contribute the density o f the observed type of failure [p. 147, Cox and Oakes (1984)].
The competing risks model estimated in this paper uses Cox (1972)
proportional hazards model, which assumes each hazard rate is proportional to a
baseline hazard Xo(t), such that for each type of transition:
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(4)

\(t, z, P) = 4>(z, P) ^o(t)

where the P’s are the zj's coefficients. Cox's proportional hazards model is estimated
by maximizing the partial likelihood function, which allows inferences on P without
specifying the baseline hazard. The estimation is thus semi-parametric. Nevertheless,
given estimates o f P, it is possible to construct sensible non-parametric estimates of the
baseline hazards (Cox and Oakes, 1984), as it will be shown graphically.
The sample utilized for the hazard model estimation consists of 6,497
temporary workers in the second quarter of 1995, who stay in the sample for a one
year period. Because the sample used in the duration analysis is not extended to all
working age individuals, the likelihoods o f exiting to different labor force statuses
across different groups o f individuals cannot be compared, as it has been done in the
multinomial logit analysis. In contrast, in the present analysis, we obtain important
information on how temporary workers’ likelihood of first exiting to a given labor
status changes according to their current job tenure when we control for personal, job
and job-search characteristics.
Temporary workers can exit to five different labor force outcomes, including a
new temporary job. Each worker is tracked until they first exit their initial temporary
job or until the sample period ends in the second quarter o f 1996, in which case their
duration is treated as censored. In modeling the hazard for a given type of failure,
temporary employment ending in an exit different from the primary failure being
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examined (i.e. if we are examining the unemployment hazard, exiting to unemployment
represents the primary failure) is also treated as censored.
The dependent variable is the 1995-temporary job duration. The covariates,
described in Table 7, account for personal, job and job-search characteristics. The
final specification of the hazard model was subject to previous specification tests
conducted during the model estimation. I report the result from the specification test
using an unconstrained model that includes the unemployment office registration
variables from Table 7 and a constrained model without those two variables.
Hazard Estimation Results

The results from estimating a semi-parametric Cox's proportional hazard model
with fixed covariates are displayed in Table 9 . The number of failures provides the
count of individuals exiting to the specific labor force status considered when
estimating each hazard. Due to the small number o f failures in the estimation of the
permanent employment and the other non-salaried occupation hazards (195 and 57
respectively), some of the variables under consideration are empty categories and are
dropped from the model during its estimation; they are denoted by "NA" (not
available).
If female, a temporary worker increases her hazard of exiting the labor force
and reduces her likelihood o f obtaining a new temporary job, relative to men. Thus,
females have a lower likelihood of perpetuating their temporary work status. Age has
some significa n t effects on temporary workers' transition patterns. Teenage workers,
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Table 9
Hazard Model Coefficients for Temporary Workers' Exits Towards
Another Temporary Job, a Permanent Job, a Non-Salaried Job,
Unemployment or Non-Participation in the Labor Force
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Unemployment
Hazard

Temporary
Work
Hazard

Permanent
Work
Hazard

Nonsalary
Work
Hazard

(0.153)

0.127*
(0.072)

-0.107***
(0.039)

-0.136
(0.189)

-0.244
(0.404)

Age 16

0.127
(0.197)

0.106
(0.105)

0.033
(0.056)

-0.773*
(0.438)

-0.186
(0.556)

Age25

-0.470***
(0.172)

0.066
(0.076)

0.007
(0.043)

-0 . 0 2 2
(0 .2 0 0 )

-0.049
(0.377)

Age30

-0.388*
(0.198)

-0.118
(0.098)

-0.040
(0.054)

0.157
(0.246)

-0.109
(0.504)

Age35

-0.392*
(0.230)

-0.057
(0 . 1 1 2 )

-0.116*
(0.067)

0.297
(0.283)

0.326
(0.490)

Age40

-0.486**
(0.245)

-0.085
(0.127)

-0.071
(0.075)

-0.036
(0.367)

-0.157
(0.677)

Age45

-0.164
(0.240)

-0.195
(0.142)

-0.083
(0.085)

-0.337
(0.470)

NA

Age50

-0.411
(0.291)

0.009
(0.148)

-0.052
(0.092)

-0.231
(0.561)

-1.053
(1.095)

Age55

-0.237
(0.359)

-0.505**
(0.240)

-0.147
(0.126)

-0.051
(0.651)

-0.394
(1.111)

Covariates
Female

Non
Participation
Hazard
0 5 9 9 ***
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Table 9—Continued

Non
salary
Work
Hazard

Unemployment
Hazard

Temporary
Work
Hazard

Permanent
Work
Hazard

-0.027
(0.559)

-0.783*
(0.453)

-0.302
(0.214)

0.007
(1.080)

NA

Main Person

-0.123
(0.209)

0.041
(0.084)

-0.013
(0.049)

0.275
(0.217)

0.154
(0.417)

Partner

0.725***
(0.175)

-0 . 1 0 2
(0 . 1 0 0 )

-0.045
(0.058)

0.256
(0.243)

- 1.0 2 2
(0.801)

Other Person

0.159
(0.251)

0.083
(0.116)

-0 . 1 1 2
(0.071)

-0.028
(0.358)

0.389
(0.495)

Primary

0.127
(0.137)

0.095
(0.069)

-0.013
(0.040)

-0.479*
(0.245)

-0.0230
(0.368)

University

-0.119
(0.157)

-0.019
(0.074)

-0.066
(0.041)

0.231
(0.179)

0.171
(0.369)

Agriculture

0.507**
(0.232)

0.614***
(0.123)

0.231***
(0.083)

0.195
(0.557)

1.036
(0.731)

Industrial
Sector

0.029
(0.177)

-0.060
(0.090)

-0 .0 1 1
(0.044)

-0.023
(0.217)

-0.179
(0.435)

Construction

-0.049
(0 .2 1 0 )

0.385***
(0.086)

-0 .2 2 2 ***
(0.050)

-0.005***
(0.318)

0.498
(0.439)

Managers &
Public
Administrators

-0.469
(0.975)

-0 . 0 0 2
(0.269)

-0.566**
(0.258)

NA

NA

Technicians &
Professionals

0.166
(0.217)

-0.019
(0.113)

(0.063)

-0 . 0 0 2
(0.250)

0.071
(0.599)

Non
Participation
Hazard

Age60

Covariates

0 .0 1 2
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Table 9—Continued

Unemployment
Hazard

Temporary
Work
Hazard

Permanent
Work
Hazard

Nonsalary
Work
Hazard

-0.514*
(0.278)

-0.189
(0.119)

0.130**
(0.061)

0.442*
(0.241)

-0.652
(0.786)

0.320
(0.337)

-0.421**
(0.194)

-0.215*
(0.130)

-1.809
(1.260)

-0.642
(1.004)

Non
Participation
Hazard

Administrative
Workers
Agriculture
Workers

Covariates

Manufacture &
Construction
Workers

0.136
(0.204)

-0.055
(0.096)

-0.017
(0.053)

-0.155
(0.258)

0.327
(0.521)

Non-qualified
Workers

0.302*
(0.157)

0.152*
(0.087)

-0.037
(0.051)

-0.486
(0.280)

-0.587
(0.589)

Seasonal

0.604**
(0.265)

0.535***
(0.146)

-0.395***
(0.137)

-0.930
(1.033))

(0.599)

0.041
(0.051)

0.781**
(0.312)

0.125
(0.583)

Full-time

-0.354**
(0.151)

-0.003
(0.091)

1 .1 2 2

Public Sector

-0.227
(0.186)

0.454***
(0.080)

-0.199***
(0.057)

-0 . 2 1 0
(0.326)

-0.208
(0.586)

Search

-0.292
(0.223)

0.385***
(0.096)

-0.027
(0.065)

-0.560
(0.395)

0.475
(0.465)

Regression Fit Statistics
6,497

6,497

6,497

6,497

6,497

Number of
Failures

377

1,347

4,232

195

57

Chi-square

Chi2(28)=

Chi2(28)=
173.1

Chi2(28)=
107.5

Chi2(28)=

Chi2(28)=
37.5

N

2 0 2 .2

8 8 .8
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Table 9—Continued

Covariates

Non
Participation
Hazard

Unemployment
Hazard

Temporary
Work
Hazard

Permanent
Work
Hazard

Non
salary
Work
Hazard

Regression Fit Statistics
0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Log Likelihood

-2,625.43

-9,648.26

-31,245.01

-1,356.33

-399.91

Cox: LR test

Chi2(4)=
9.32

Chi2(4)=
4.26

Chi2(4)=
0.71

Chi2(4)=
3.38

Chi2(4)=
3.83

Prob>Chisquare

Note: The following variables are used as reference: age20, household’s son,
secondary education, service sector and sales/services workers as occupation.
*Statistically significant at the . 10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. The
5% critical value for Chi2(4) equals 9.49.

aged 16 to 19 year old, are less likely to obtain permanent employment status than
their 20 to 24 year old counterparts.
Age can be considered a proxy for human capital with younger workers
enjoying less human capital and, thus, lower likelihood to obtain a permanent position.
Additionally, education seems to pay off as lower educational attainment reduces
workers' likelihood o f exiting to a permanent job.
Temporary employment in agriculture increases workers' hazards o f renewing
their temporary work status and their unemployment hazard due to their very specific
skills. Managers and public administrators, on the other hand, are less likely to
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perpetuate temporary employment, and administrative temporary employees are more
likely to continue their salaried status in general, either through a temporary or a
permanent job.
Additionally, temporary workers covering seasonal activities or working in the
public sector show a significantly lower likelihood o f perpetuating their status. This
result might be explained by the extensive use by the Administration o f fixed-term
contracts exhausting the maximum contract duration and prohibiting workers and
employers from further signing new temporary contracts.
Finally, full-time temporary workers are more likely to be employed on a
permanent basis, instead o f on a temporary basis, in the future. The result possibly
reflects their higher commitment to work.
These results coincide with Alba-Ramirez (1997) findings using a sample o f
temporary workers and examining their exiting patterns to various labor force statuses.
His results indicate that women, youths and less educated temporary workers are less
likely to obtain permanent employment status. Similarly, job tenure, as an indicator of
greater work commitment, has a positive effect on the probability of obtaining a
permanent job.
Using the estimated coefficients from Cox’s proportional modeL, it is possible
to recover estimates o f the baseline survivor and baseline hazard functions. In general,
survivor functions (S(t)) provide us with information regarding the probability that a
temporary work spell will survive after t periods o f time. Therefore, we can derive the
probability that a temporary job will end in a particular labor force status after t
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periods of time (F(t)) since: F(t)=l-S(t). Hazard rates, on the other hand, inform us
on the rate at which spells of temporary employment are ended after duration t, given
that they last at least until period t. Both, survivor functions and hazard rates, are of
great policy value since they reveal how the probability o f exiting temporary
employment to a given labor force status changes with the tenure at the temporary job.
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that baseline functions refer to the values of
the functions when all covariates are set to zero.
In the proportional hazard model where the hazard rate can be written as:

(5)

\(t, z, P) = <j>(z, P) Xo(t) = ^o(t) exp{PiZ!+...+PkZk},

Xo(t) is called the baseline hazard. The idea behind it is that if <J)(z, P) =
exp{PiZi+.. ,+pkZk} = 1, the hazard rate coincides with the baseline hazard. That is,
everyone has the same “hazard-shape”, although the hazard function values may differ
due to differences in the covariates. Therefore, the hazard functions may
display different levels or may be scaled up or down according to different values of
(j)(z, P). Likewise, since the survivor function can be easily derived using the hazard
and density functions, the baseline survivor function is based on the assumption that
<j>(z, p) = exp{p1zi+...+pkzk} = 1 .
Although the estimated hazard model appeared to be the best specification, it is
reasonable to question the sensitivity of the hazard and survivor functions to different
values for the explanatory variables since they are plotted under the assumption that all
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covariates equal zero. For that reason, I estimate separate Cox proportional hazards
models under the constraint the coefficients are equal, but allowing the hazard and
survivor functions to differ by workers’ age, gender, education and activity.
A test for the equality of survivor functions for each age group, gender,
educational level and activity is subsequently completed. The test being used is the
“Cox” test (Stata-Volume 3, 1997). This is a likelihood-ratio test on the results from
a Cox proportional-hazards regression for each o f the age, gender, education and
activity groups. The test is a test that the coefficients are zero or the hazard rates are
one. The equality tests and their findings are reported in the Appendix C.
The results from the equality tests of the baseline survivor functions
corresponding to different outcomes in the model indicate that the hypothesis of
equality is rejected when comparing across: (a) genders, educational levels and
activities in the non-participation outcome; (b) educational levels and activities in the
unemployment outcome; (c) ages, genders, educational levels and activities in the
temporary work outcome; (d) educational levels and activities in the permanent work
outcome; and (e) genders in the non-salaried work (or occupation-other) outcome.
As the hypothesis of equality of the survivor functions across different age
groups, genders, educational levels or activities for exits to each labor force status is
rejected, I report the baseline survivor functions adjusted for age, gender, educational
background or worker’s activity for each o f the outcomes in the model. Instead of
estimating the model for zero values of the covariates, I set the values of the
covariates being used in the hazard model estimation equal to their means. For
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example, since the average age in the sample equals 29, the covariate age is set equal
to 29 instead o f equal to zero, since there are no newborns in the data. I proceed
similarly with education, gender and activity.
Figures 1 through 5 display the adjusted baseline survivor functions for each
labor force status outcome. Several characteristics are noticeable from these graphs:
1. Figure I reveals that the probability that a temporary work spell will survive
withdrawal from the workforce steadily decreases over time. Therefore, temporary
work spells appear to end in non-participation in a staggered fashion, as opposed to
temporary work transitions to a new temporary job, as I shall now explain.
2. More interestingly, however, are Figures 2 and 3. They both display a
rapidly declining likelihood that a temporary work spell might survive either
unemployment or a new temporary job. In particular, transitions from temporary work
to unemployment are most likely to take place within two years tenure, while
temporary job transitions appear to be mostly limited to the first year of tenure.
3. Finally, a strikingly different pattern o f transition is displayed in Figure 4 and Figure
5. In both instances, the probabilities that a transition from temporary employment to
permanent or non-salaried job might have not taken place at time period t, are quite
high. Consequently, exits from temporary work to permanent period t, are quite high.
Consequently, exits from temporary work to permanent employment can be
considered rare, regardless of the time frame taken in consideration.
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Figure 2. Unemployment Survivor Function.
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Figure 4. Permanent Employment Survivor Function.
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Figure 5. Non-Salaried Work Survivor Function.

Baseline hazard functions for each of the outcomes in the model can also be
derived from the estimated coefficients. In the present model, hazard rates provide
instantaneous rates of exit from temporary work to a given labor force status,
provided an exit has not occurred yet. Since survivor functions proved to differ
according to the age, education, gender and/or activity o f the worker, baseline hazard
functions should also be adjusted to the mean values o f those covariates. Nonetheless,
because o f software limitations in deriving the latter, I report separate baseline hazard
functions for the different values of those covariates for which baseline survivor
functions differed. The graphs, which inform the reader on the sensitivity o f the
baseline hazard functions to various values of the covariates, are displayed and
partially discussed in Appendix D. Notice that the impact o f workers’ characteristics
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on their exit hazards for the five labor force statuses considered by the model has
already being addressed by the estimated coefficients o f the Cox proportional hazards
model. Therefore, I choose to focus my discussion on the general baseline hazards for
each outcome in the model, which are displayed in Figures 6 through 10. The latter
basically corroborate our previous findings in the adjusted survivor functions. In
particular, the following characteristics are noteworthy:
1. Figures 6 and 7 indicate that the probability that a temporary job might end
at period t in unemployment or non-participation shows a mode between

1 1 /2

years

and 2 years of tenure. The probabilities decrease thereafter until a 5 year tenure is
attained, at which point the trend is reversed. As a result, long term temporary
employment steadily raises workers’ likelihood of exiting the labor force or becoming
unemployed once they exit their temporary job.
2. Figure

8

ascertains that temporary work is likely to become a trap,

prolonging workers’ contingent status. The baseline hazard o f exiting temporary
employment to a new temporary job presents its mode at the first year of tenure.
Although this result can be sensitive to the assumed values o f the covariates,
the rates of exit shown in Appendix D for the temporary employment outcome display
modes between the 24 to 36 month tenure in its majority, regardless o f the worker’s
age, gender, education and activity. In addition, this result supports the findings from
the analysis of the adjusted baseline survivor function for the temporary work
outcome, according to which the probability that the temporary worker will not exit to
another temporary job in approximately one year period, is low.
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Figure 7. Unemployment Hazard.
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Figure 9. Permanent Employment Hazard.
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Figure 10. Non-Salaried Work Hazard.

3.

Figures 9 and 10 confirm temporary workers' low transition likelihood

towards permanent employment or non-salaried work regardless of tenure.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the determinants o f work transitions into and out of
temporary employment in Spain during 1995 and 1996. First, the incidence of
temporary employment, its voluntary versus involuntary nature, and labor market
transition patterns were analyzed. Temporary workers are younger, less experienced
and educated than permanent workers. In addition, temporary employment’s
incidence is slightly higher on women. Temporary workers tend to occupy positions
primarily in the agriculture, construction, trade and service sectors. They experience a
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high level of job insecurity, which is one of the main reasons for their job search along
with the desire to improve their wage and working hours conditions. In addition,
Spanish temporary workers do not appear to be voluntarily employed but rather forced
into these jobs. As a result, Spanish temporary employment can be considered as
primarily demand-led.
Entry into temporary employment is significantly prevalent among individuals
with ages ranging from 20 to 25 years old, low tenure and occupations in the
agriculture or construction sectors. Additionally, workers’ mobility into temporary
employment shows a strong dependence on their previous labor force status, with
temporary workers as the most likely to have a new temporary job a year later,
followed by unemployment and out of the labor force individuals. Long
unemployment spells appear to be fairly common, since those working undertaking job
search activities or registered in the unemployment office are very likely to be
unemployed a year later. Likewise, highly educated and out o f the workforce
individuals also share a high probability of being unemployed in the following year;
yet, they are more likely to be working on a temporary than on a permanent basis.
The latter result seems to capture the role of temporary employment in university
students’ transitions from school to work. As a result, temporary employment, aside
from being perpetuated for most temporary workers, is often used as a means to enter
the workforce.
Work transitions out o f temporary employment and into permanent
employment are unlikely according to the multinomial logit results. In fact, work
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transitions to permanent employment are rare for all groups o f workers. Therefore,
temporary work becomes a trap rather than a bridge to permanent employment in
most instances. In addition, temporary workers are the least likely to exit the labor
force or become non-salaried workers and the second most likely to become
unemployed a year later. Furthermore, job transitions from temporary work into
permanent employment are the least likely for youths, least educated workers and
those in the construction industry, as indicated by the hazard model results. However,
full-time work schedules raise workers' likelihood of becoming permanent employees.
Finally, baseline survivor functions point out the large probability of a
temporary work spell ending in a new temporary work within the first year of tenure.
Baseline hazards confirm such result and indicate that hazard rates for this transition
reach their mode after a year of tenure. On the contrary, temporary work spells are
likely to survive an exit to permanent employment, thus unlikely to end in a permanent
job. This finding is supported by the low probability of exiting to permanent work
arrangements displayed by temporary workers’ baseline hazard for transitions to
permanent employment.
Summarizing, the results indicate that temporary employment is not very
effective as a vehicle towards permanent employment. It rather lengthens the
worker's contingent status, as suggested by segmentation theories. Provided the
demand-led character o f Spanish temporary employment, its efficiency as a bridge
towards permanent employment could be improved by promoting employers’
conversion of temporary jobs into permanent work arrangements as well as by
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reducing their reliance on temporary contracts. Therefore, I now turn to the analysis
o f temporary employment from the employer’s perspective. In particular, I focus on
identifying and understanding the economic factors determining employers’ conversion
rate of temporary contracts into permanent work arrangements as well as their
temporary employment practices. The latter could be o f great policy value in the
design o f effective policies targeting job security.
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CHAPTER IV

T E M P O R A R Y E M P L O Y M E N T V E R S U S P E R M A N E N T E M P L O Y M E N T : T H E IR
E F F E C T O N JO B C R E A T I O N , J O B D E S T R U C T I O N , J O B A N D W O R K E R
R E A L L O C A T IO N

The last chapter emphasized the involuntary character of temporary
employment along with its inefficacy as a bridge towards permanent and stable
employment. Indeed, Spanish unions, employers’ organizations and the Spanish
Government, preoccupied about the implications of temporary employment on net
employment, job security and workers’ morale, participated in a series o f tripartite
agreements promoting employment stability, particularly in 1997 (Preamble-Law
8/1997 and Law 9/1997).
This chapter uses establishment level data from the Ministry of Labor to
examine temporary versus permanent job creation and job destruction, their
contribution to net employment creation, and their corresponding job and worker
reallocation rates during the 1990s. The descriptive statistics are revealing of the
employment situation experienced by the Spanish labor market during this past decade.
In particular, they provide us with a better understanding of the picture viewed as
worrisome by the Spanish authorities and labor unions and their concern over
employers’ intensive and persistent reliance on temporary workers.
I adopt Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) methodology to construct indexes of

96
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gross job creation and destruction rates, net employment growth rates, as well as gross
job reallocation rates for temporary, permanent and total employment by industry.
Their methodology has also been used by Gomez Salvador and Dolado (1995) to
compute gross job creation and destruction rates for the period 1983-92 using the
Central de Balances del Banco de Espafia. This chapter, however, examines job
creation and destruction rates, how these rates vary over time as well as by industry,
and the contribution o f temporary and permanent employment to net employment
growth rates for the 1991-96 period.
The next section describes the database being used for the analysis in this
chapter as well as in Chapter V. Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) methodology is then
briefly discussed. Lastly, the constructed estimates are presented and discussed. A
final section summarizes the main results and concludes the descriptive analysis of
employment flows in the Spanish labor market during much of the decade.

The Data

Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) used LRD data to construct their employment
figures. The LRD provides annual data on many manufacturing firms from contiguous
five-year panels and from the Census-year data on the universe o f manufacturing
establishments. Gomez Salvador and Dolado (1995) use non-weighted data from the
Central de Balances del Banco de Espana. Their data do not comprise the universe of
firms in the non-financial sector that it represents. In fact, the Central de Balances is
not even considered statistically representative o f the universe o f non-financial firms.
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Firms voluntarily choose whether to answer the Central Bank’s survey, resulting in an
overrepresentation o f large firms, public firms and firms with a high ratio o f permanent
personnel.
I make use o f the employment survey (Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral, from
now on: ECL) conducted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Matters. The main
purpose of the survey is to compile frequent data on various aspects of the labor
market, such as the composition o f the working labor force, their mobility and work
absences. In addition, some information on collective bargaining at the firm or
industry levels, and the employer’s employment expectations are contained in the
survey. The employment information is referred to those workers registered at the
firm’s unit where they process the information concerning social security
contributions, regardless o f whether they work in one or various o f the firm’s
establishments. In many instances, firms count with more than one unit at which they
keep records of their employees for social security purposes. Consequently, the
survey unit is somewhere in between the firm and the establishment, although, in most
cases, it coincides with the latter. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, we will
refer to the survey unit as the establishment in despite of their possible differences.
From 1990 through 1996, the ECL is a quarterly survey o f approximately
8,000 establishments with more than 5 workers each period, from which about

8

percent are renewed each quarter. The survey is distributed to establishments
according to random sampling. Establishments are required to report the required
information to the Ministry o f Labor. The sample is representative o f the universe of
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establishments within the economic activities being covered by the survey, which
includes most o f the Service sector, the Construction and the Industrial sectors. It
excludes the Agriculture sector as well as establishments in the Service sector
belonging to the Public Administration, Defense, Social Security, Extraterritorial
Organisms and Religious Organizations. The geographic scope of the survey
coincides with the national territory, with the exception o f Ceuta and Melilla. Finally,
the surveyed population is circumscribed to salaried workers affiliated to the Social
Security General Regime and the Special Regime for miners and coal workers who
work in establishments with more than 5 workers.8
The sample used in this study ranges from the second quarter of 1990 to the
fourth quarter o f 1996. In contrast with the LRD data used by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992), the data used in this analysis is not comprehensive of the universe of
establishments in the surveyed sectors. Nonetheless, since the sample is representative
of the universe o f establishments in the sectors being surveyed, the results should not
be much different. Data sources and characteristics are described in detail in the
Appendix A.

Methodology

Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) construct gross job creation, destruction and
reallocation rates using the following measures o f establishment size and growth rate.
Establishment’s size at time period t is measured by x* = (ii* + ne,n)/2 , which is the
simple average o f the establishment’s employment at t and at t-1. Industry’s size is
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defined analogously by Xu = (n;t + n^.x)/!. The establishment’s employment growth
rate from period t-l to period t is thus given by the change in the establishment’s
employment from t-l to t divided by x*, which results in get = (net - n^-iVx,*.9 Job
creation and destruction are measured by summing up employment gains at expanding
or newly created establishments and by summing up employment losses at shrinking or
newly disappeared establishments in each industry, respectively. These flows are then
transformed to rates dividing by the industry size. Thus,

(6 )

POSu = I f =Flt (xc/ XiOget, if get > 0 and

(7)

NEGit = I f

6 Fit (X et/

Xit)|get|, if get < 0,

where Fit represents all establishments in industry i and time period t. Additionally,
gross job reallocation and net employment growth measures are obtained by adding
and subtracting employment creation and employment destruction rates for each
industry, respectively, i.e.

(8 )

S U M u = P O S it+ N E G t

stands for gross job reallocation rate and

(9)

N E T u = PO Su - N E G t

indicates net employment growth rate in industry i at time t. Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) appropriately note that the rate of gross job reallocation SUM* represents an
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upper bound o f the number o f workers who change jobs due to job reallocation. For a
lower bound on the number o f workers who change jobs that avoids the double
counting of job losers moving from a shrinking establishment to an expanding one
within the industry, they suggest:

(9)

MAXit = max{POSit, NEGu}.

Results

Table 10 and Table 11 display annual employment creation and destruction
rates, reallocation rates o f jobs and workers and net employment growth rates for
total, temporary and permanent employment by year. In addition, the tables inform us
on the contribution of temporary and permanent employment to net employment for
each year under consideration.
Simultaneous job creation and destruction took place in every year under
consideration for total employment, as well as temporary and permanent employment.
High job creation rates, particularly from 1992 to 1993, were accompanied by high job
destruction, job reallocation (fourth columns) and worker reallocation (fifth columns)
rates for total employment, temporary and permanent employment. This result could
be driven by the ongoing economic crisis, which resulted in a time period characterized
by low net employment creation rates, particularly for temporary employment as well
as for overall employment.
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Table 10
Net and Gross Rates o f Total Employment by Year

NET,
due to

NET,
due to
NpERM

Year

POSt

NEGt

SUMt

MAXt

NET,

N temp

1991

0.086

0.045

0.132

0.086

0.041

0.016

0.025

1992

0.117

0.067

0.185

0.117

0.050

-3e-03

0.053

1993

0 .1 0 1

0.093

0.149

0.103

8.5e-03

-0.024

0.032

1994

0.096

0.065

0.162

0.097

0.032

9e-03

0.023

1995

0.097

0.049

0.146

0.097

0.048

0 .0 2 2

0.027

1996

0.109

0.044

0.153

0 .1 1 0

0.066

0 .0 2 1

0.045

In terms o f temporary and permanent employment’s contributions to net
employment creation, Table 10 shows how temporary work’s contribution to the latter
attained its lowest mark in 1993, in the midst o f the economic recession. Conversely,
the percentage o f net employment accounted by temporary versus permanent
employment reached its peak during the economic recovery years of 1995 and 1996.
Table 11 also shows how net temporary employment creation was, indeed, the highest
for 1995-1996, when temporary job creation and job destruction were the lowest. On
the contrary, net permanent employment creation was higher from 1991 to 1993 than
during the economic recovery in 1995 and 1996. The latter years were, as with
temporary employment, marked by lower job creation, job destruction, job
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Table 11
Net and Gross Rates of Temporary and Permanent Employment by Year

Year

PO St

NEGt

SU M t

M AXt

NETt

Temporary Employment
1991

0.225

0.181

0.406

0.230

0.044

1992

0.246

0.269

0.515

0.275

-0.023

1993

0.224

0.354

0.578

0.358

-0.130

1994

0.195

0.153

0.348

0 .2 0 0

0.042

1995

0.193

0.117

0.467

0.193

0.076

1996

0.214

0.139

0.352

0.214

0.075

Permanent Employment
1991

0.094

0.057

0.151

0.093

0.145

1992

0.143

0.067

0 .2 1 0

0.143

0.076

1993

0 .1 2 1

0.075

0.196

0 .1 2 1

0.047

1994

0.097

0.063

0.160

0.097

0.034

1995

0.099

0.063

0.162

0.099

0.037

1996

0.113

0.046

0.159

0.113

0.067

reallocation and worker reallocation rates. In any event, the most striking pattern
from Table 11 is temporary employment’s higher job destruction and creation rates,
which reveal its more cyclically sensitive nature relative to permanent employment.
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Tables 12 and 13 show net and gross rates of total employment, temporary and
permanent employment by industry. In particular, Table 12 indicates that the service
and commerce industries displayed the largest job creation rates, while the
manufacturing industry showed the highest job destruction, job reallocation and
worker reallocation rates for the period under consideration.

Table

12

Net and Gross Rates of Total Employment by Industry

NETi

NETi

due to

due to

Industry

PO Si

NEGi

SUM;

MAX,

NET;

N temp

NpERM

Manufact.

0 .1 0 2

0.080

0.198

0.118

0.039

-2e-03

0.041

Construct.

0.073

0.053

0.063

0.073

0 .0 2 0

0 .0 1 0

9e-03

Commerce

0.107

0.054

0.162

0.107

0.052

2e-03

0.050

Service

0.108

0.055

0.163

0.108

0.054

0.018

0.036

Note: Manufact stands for the manufacturing industry, Construct indicates the
construction industry.

As shown by Table 13, large job creation rates in the service and commerce
industries were probably explained by the also large job creation rates exhibited in
those industries by permanent employment. These rates resulted in a positive
permanent employment creation as well as in a positive contribution to net
employment growth. However, the high job destruction, job reallocation and worker
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Table 13
Net and Gross Rates o f Temporary and Permanent Employment by Industry

Industry

POSi

NEG,

SUMi

MAX;

NET;

Temporary Employment
Manufact.

0.290

0.316

0.606

0.365

-0.027

Construct.

0.138

0.133

0.280

0.160

0.013

Commerce

0.171

0.167

0.443

0.197

4.2e-03

Service

0.257

0.191

0.423

0.257

0.066

Permanent Employment
Manufact.

0.117

0.071

0.188

0.117

0.047

Construct.

0.058

0.042

0.099

0.058

0.017

Commerce

0.146

0.061

0.206

0.146

0.085

Service

0.123

0.074

0.198

0.123

0.049

Note: Manufact stands for the manufacturing industry, Construct indicates the
construction industry.
reallocation rates in the manufacturing industry were driven by temporary
employment’s also large job destruction, job reallocation and worker reallocation in
the industry. As a result, temporary employment growth and its contribution to net
employment creation in the manufacturing industry were both negative during this
period of time.
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Conclusion

Chapter III revealed the involuntary nature of temporary employment and its
likelihood o f becoming a trap, perpetuating temporary workers’ precarious labor force
status. Spanish unions, employers’ organizations and Government, aware o f the latter
and preoccupied about its implications on net employment, job stability, and workers’
morale, have participated in tripartite agreements promoting employment stability
during the last years (Preamble-Law 8/1997 and Law 9/1997).
This chapter provides with a better understanding of the picture viewed as
worrisome by Spanish authorities and labor unions previous to their tripartite
discussions with employers’ organizations and the passage of Laws 8/1997 and 9/1997
promoting permanent employment. With that purpose, I examine job creation, job
destruction, job reallocation, worker reallocation rates and the contribution o f both,
temporary and permanent employment in the creation of net employment for the
period 1990-1996 using Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) methodology.
The empirical evidence reveals that, for the time period under consideration job
creation, job destruction, job reallocation and worker reallocation rates were the
highest in 1992-1993, coinciding with the economic recession. Temporary
employment contributed negatively to net employment creation during those two
years, while the contribution o f permanent employment grew lower with respect to
that at the beginning o f the decade. Industry wise, job creation appeared the highest in
the service industry, commerce and trade; the latter propelled by permanent job
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creation in such industries. On the other hand, job destruction, job reallocation and
worker reallocation rates were the largest in the manufacturing sector, where
temporary employment dramatically fluctuated.
Overall, the descriptive analysis indicates that job creation, job destruction, job
and worker reallocation rates were comparatively larger in the 1992-1993 period. The
latter contributed to reduced job security and fed labor unions’ and the Spanish
Government’s awareness o f their serious implications on employment stability, firms’
productivity and workers’ morale. As a result, a series of firm incentives attempting to
limit employers’ reliance on temporary workers and promote their conversion of
temporary contracts into permanent contracts were approved. Nonetheless, much of
the existing evidence from the past year points towards the inefficacy o f such measures
in reaching the set goals (ABC, Diario de Economia, August 10, 1998).
Consequently, the importance of identifying the determinants of employers’ intensive
use o f temporary workers and their conversion of temporary contracts into permanent
contracts. Which are these determinants? How can employers’ temporary
employment practices be effectively altered? The following chapter looks into these
questions.
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CHAPTER V

EMPLOYERS’ TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND THEIR ROLE
IN WORKERS’ TRANSITION FROM "TEMP TO PERM"

Regardless o f their previous regulation under the Spanish labor law, temporary
contracts were not widely used by Spanish employers before 1984. For the first time,
the 1984 Workers' Statute reform provided a detailed regulation o f temporary
contracts that promoted employment flexibility through substantial reductions in
dismissal costs, social security taxes, and even wages under practical and training
temporary contracts. Nonetheless, increased labor flexibility came only at the margin,
leaving permanent contracts’ regulation unchanged. As a result, a dual labor market in
which temporary workers endure worse working conditions than their permanent
counterparts quickly developed.
Not surprisingly, Spanish temporary employment displays a rather involuntary
nature, as proven by the fact that approximately eighty-five percent of temporary
workers admit to being forced into these jobs due to their inability to find a permanent
work arrangement and only 0.4 percent declare to have been actually seeking a
temporary job in 1996.10 Consequently, Spanish temporary employment can be
classified as mostly a demand-led, instead o f supply-led phenomenon. Thus, in order
to be able to design effective policies targeting employment security, it is important to
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improve our understanding o f the demand side determinants o f temporary
employment.
I first examine employers’ hiring patterns. Since much o f the growth of
temporary employment took place following the dismissal cost reductions and the
flexibility granted by the 1984 Workers’ Statute reform, it seems reasonable to believe
that Spanish employers are constrained in their hiring practices. Job security makes
permanent workers comparable to fixed capital to the firm. Consequently, employers
might simply prefer hiring temporary workers, screening them and later on evaluating
whether, according to their productivity and value added to the firm, they should
become permanent employees or rather be substituted by new temporary workers at
no prohibiting large costs.
Secondly, since Spanish temporary employment exhibits a demand-led
character where temporary workers’ characteristics play a minor role in their
likelihood o f transition to a permanent job, employers’ job conversion from “temp to
perm” constitutes a primary channel to secure stable employment in an economy
traditionally characterized by high unemployment rates. Being aware of the latter,
unions negotiated with the Government and employers’ organizations a series of firm
incentives, incorporated in the Laws 8 and 9/1997, to promote the transformation of
temporary contracts into permanent contracts and limit employers’ reliance on
temporary employment.
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Nonetheless, Spanish unions have denounced the still deficient conversion of
temporary contracts into permanent contracts. Identifying the determinants of
employers’ contract conversion from “temp to perm” carries a great policy value since
augmenting worker mobility could help correct for the dual labor market character
originated by temporary employment deregulation.
In addition, the still large percentage o f temporary workers held by most firms,
approximately 33 percent, in despite of the adopted measures promoting job security,
have caused policy debates amongst unions, employers’ organizations and the
Government. Consequently, examining which economic variables determine
employers’ conversion of temporary contracts to permanent contracts and their
reliance on temporary workers becomes essential in the design of effective
employment policies targeting job security.
Previous work on Spanish temporary employment has mostly focused upon
analyzing its incidence using the Labor Force Survey. Most studies along this line of
research investigate how workers’ personal and job characteristics explain their
entrance into temporary employment and their job mobility to alternative work
statuses (Segura, Duran, Toharia, and Bentolila, 1991; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994;
Ruiz-Quintillana and Claes, 1996; Alba-Ramirez, 1997). Studies using Spanish firm
level data have examined the effect of temporary employment on workers’ wages,
productivity, and the employers’ decision to provide formal training (Bentolila and
Dolado, 1994; Alba-Ramirez, 1994). However, little is known about the determinants
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of firms’ temporary employment practices. This chapter takes into account the
involuntary character o f Spanish temporary employment and addresses the gap in the
literature by examining the demand-led determinants of both the conversion rate from
a temporary work status to a permanent one and the percentage o f temporary workers
in the surveyed establishments.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide empirical evidence and
briefly explain Spanish employers’ constrained hiring, intensive reliance on temporary
workers and their conversion o f temporary contracts to permanent ones. Second, I
formalize the observed evidence into a simple model of employers’ temporary
employment practices in the presence o f a segmented labor market where temporary
contracts allow for substantial reductions in hiring and dismissal costs. Various
testable hypotheses on the importance of hiring and dismissal costs for temporary
versus permanent workers, worker representation, employment expectations and
trends on job transitions from “temp to perm” and on the percentage o f the
establishments’ workforce under temporary contracts are derived from the model. In a
third section, some descriptive statistics on the incidence o f temporary employment by
establishment characteristics in Spain are presented. The descriptive analysis helps us
to familiarize ourselves with the distribution o f temporary workers across Spanish
establishments and those establishment characteristics the regression analysis needs to
control for. A fourth section uses the ECL data, described in Appendix A, to test and
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examine the model’s empirical predictions. A summary of the main findings and some
comments on their implications conclude the chapter.

Spanish Employers’ Temporary Employment Practices
As previously mentioned, much of the experienced growth in temporary
employment took place after substantial dismissal cost reductions were granted for
temporary contracts under the 1984 Workers’ Statute reform. The main purpose of
the new legislation was to lower unemployment by augmenting employment flexibility
through lower firing costs associated to flexible work contracts. Spanish employers,
constrained by the rigidities and high dismissal costs associated to permanent work
contracts, strongly relied on the new flexible contracts to meet their labor demands.
Using establishment level data from the ECL, described in Appendix A, Table 14
shows the average proportion o f newly signed temporary contracts from 1990 to 1996
for the establishments being surveyed. On average, 84 percent of employers’ newly
concluded contracts for the establishments within the scope o f the survey were
temporary." Similar percentages are found in other European countries, such as
France, where 86 percent o f newly hired people are now on short-term contracts (The
Economist, August 8, 1998). Table 15 reveals how the average percentage of new
contracts that are temporary varied across the surveyed industries, being the lowest in
the service and manufacturing industries and the largest in the construction industry,
where it reached an average o f nearly 94 percent of all new contracts.
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Table 14
Standard Descriptive Statistics o f the Proportions of: New Workers in Temporary
Contracts, Last Quarter’s Temporary Contracts Converted to Permanent
Contracts, and Temporary Employees in the Sample

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

C.V.

Proportion o f New Contracts
That Are Temporary

0.84

0.70

82.55

Proportion o f Last Quarter’s
Temporary Contracts Converted
to Permanent Contracts

0.03

0.14

477.17

Proportion o f Temporary
Workers

0.29

0.30

105.50

Source: Author’s Tabulations Using the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL).

In very few instances, employers used temporary contracts as a screening device in the
hiring of permanent workers or promoted their temporary workers to a permanent
status. Table 14 indicates that, on average, only 3 percent o f the establishments’
previous quarter temporary contracts became permanent in the subsequent period,
with the conversion being the highest in the manufacturing and service industries and
the lowest in the construction industry as shown in Table 15. The limited conversion
o f contracts from “temp to perm” has been the subject o f recent unions’ complaints,
coinciding with the first anniversary o f the Laws 8 and 9/1997 that regulated firm
incentives to promote employers’ conversion of temporary contracts into permanent.
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Table 15
Average Proportion of: New Workers in Temporary Contracts, Last
Quarter’s Temporary Contracts Converted to Permanent Contracts,
and Temporary Employees at the Establishment by Industry

Manufacturing

Construction

Commerce

Service

Proportion o f New
Contracts That Are
Temporary

0.82

0.94

0.89

0.80

Proportion o f Last
Quarter’s Temporary
Contracts Converted to
Permanent Contracts

0.03

0.01

0.03

0.03

Proportion of Temporary
Workers

0.25

0.56

0.36

Variable

0.32

Source: Author’s Tabulations Using the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL).

In addition, unions have continued to denounce the still large percentage of
workers on temporary. In this respect, the adopted measures in the Laws 8 and
9/1997 to promote indefinite contracts have been followed by just a two decimal
points’ decline in the temporary workforce from 33.8 percent in 1996 to 33.6 percent
in 1997 (ABC, Diario de Economia, August 10, 1998). In fact, in the public sector,
temporary employment has increased by 9 percent during the last year, while
permanent employment decreased by 1 percent (EPA, 1998), contradicting the
Government’s purpose o f increasing employment stability. Using ECL data for the
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period 1990-1996, temporary contracts appear to have accounted for an average 29
percent of the establishments’ total employment over the six-year period, as displayed
in Table 14.12
Nevertheless, this proportion varied widely across industries. Table 15 shows
that the average proportion of temporary contracts for the surveyed establishments
was the highest for the construction industry and lowest in the manufacturing industry.
While, on average over the six-year period, the construction industry counted with up
to 56 percent o f its workforce on temporary contracts, temporary contracts only
amounted to 25 percent of the manufacturing industry’s workforce.
Table 14 also reports the variability exhibited by the proportion of temporary
contracts converted to permanent and the fraction of temporary workers at the
establishment. Their relative large coefficient o f variation augurs the importance of
establishment individual characteristics in explaining the transition from a temporary to
a permanent job and the proportion o f temporary contracts at a given firm unit.
Therefore, the following specifications will control for individual establishment
characteristics when examining employers’ temporary employment patterns.

The Model and Hypotheses

Employers’ Hiring Patterns

A number o f reasons have been suggested for why employers hire temporary
workers. Some o f them include: employers’ flexibility needs, temporary workers’
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lower fringe benefits, hiring and firing costs, firms’ opportunities to screen workers
and evaluate their potential before hiring them on a permanent basis, economies of
scale and workers’ specialization (Segal and Sullivan, 1995). Nevertheless, the single
most important reason advanced by most employers is the ability to replace staff
during vacations, maternity and sick leaves, and meet seasonal fluctuations in
workloads driven by the increased competition in foreign and domestic markets
(Schellenberg and Clark, 1996; Golden, 1996; De Grip, Hoevenberg and Willems,
1997).
In this section I formalize some of the above mentioned employers’
motivations for hiring temporary workers in a simplified model with permanent and
fixed-term workers. In the model, employers’ hiring of temporary workers is driven
by employers’ flexibility needs to meet fluctuations in demand as well as by labor
market requirements in a market characterized by high unemployment and prohibitive
dismissal costs for permanent workers. I assume the establishment’s production
function is given by Y = N°, where 0 < a < 1 and N = [NP+ (1-m) Nt]1/ct, with 1 < a <
0. N refers to the establishment’s total employment, NP and NT indicate its permanent
and temporary workforce respectively, and m stands for productivity effects deriving
from temporary workers’ effort and limited contract tenure.13 The production
function allows for a comer solution since temporary and permanent workers may
have similar work responsibilities and, thus, be considered substitutes, productivity
differences aside.
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The employer tries to find a cost-minimizing way to produce a given level of
output:

(11)

Min

{[WP + cf(.)]Np + WtNt }

Np,N t
s.t.

Y = N°

where WPand Wt refer to permanent and temporary workers’ wages respectively, c
stands for firing costs specific to permanent workers and f(.) indicates the probability
that a permanent worker might be dismissed. The probability of dismissal of a
permanent worker, once we control for individual establishment characteristics, such
as industry, size, location and type of sector, is affected by permanent workers’
dismissal costs, employment demand fluctuations, collective bargaining and workers’
representation at the establishment, and regional unemployment rates.
The first order conditions yield the following comparison between temporary
and permanent workers’ marginal costs:

(12)

[WP + cf(.)] < = > WT/(l-m )

The employer hires both types o f workers only when their marginal costs
equalize, in which case there is an interior solution. Otherwise, the employer resorts
to hiring whichever type of worker has lower unit costs, resulting in a comer solution
in which only temporary or permanent workers are newly hired. Although, on
average, 84 percent o f establishments’ new employees from 1990 through 1996 were
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temporary, some of the establishments in the data only hire temporary workers while
others do not. Consequently, interior as well as comer solutions are present in the
data and accounted by the model.14
In addition to firing and hiring costs o f temporary versus permanent workers,
future employment expectations, the presence o f collective bargaining and regional
unemployment rates may affect the dismissal probability of permanent workers and,
thus, influence employers’ hiring o f temporary workers. Consequently, the analysis
controls for establishments’ own characteristics, such as industry, type o f sector, size
and location, the proportion of temporary workers among the newly hired can be
written as:

(13)

(Ntnew/Nnew) = function of {[WP + cf(.)]/WT/(l-m), employment expectations,
collective bargaining and unemployment rates affecting f(.)}.

Employers’ Contract Conversions From Temporary to Permanent

Do Spanish employers use temporary employment as a hiring and screening
device to differentiate the quality o f their newly hired workers? According to the
empirical evidence in Table 14, Spanish employers rarely transform their contracts
from temporary to permanent, as indicated by the fact that only 3 percent o f the
establishments’ previous temporary contracts becomes permanent.
Nonetheless, when deciding whether to convert a temporary contract to
permanent, employers, as in the hiring process, compare relative employment costs

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119
adjusted for productivity differences and consider future employment demands. In
addition, since temporary employment has been particularly encouraged by public
policy to increase labor market flexibility and reduce the high unemployment rate,
labor market institutions, such as workers’ representation, and regional unemployment
rates have much to do with the conversion o f temporary contracts into permanent
ones. Therefore, controlling for establishment industry, type o f sector, size and
location, the conversion rate of temporary contracts into permanent can be specified as
follows:

(14)

^ c o n v e rs io n

= (No. of Contracts Converted to Permanent/NT, n ) =

= function of {[WP + cf(.)]AVT/(l-m), employment expectations, collective
bargaining and unemployment rates affecting f(.)},

where NT,t-i stands for establishments’ temporary employment at period t-1. All other
variables are referred to time period t.
Several hypotheses can be drawn from equation (14). A higher ratio of
temporary to permanent work wages increases relative hiring cots for temporary
workers. Consequently, the number o f temporary contracts converted into permanent
contracts would rise while the number of temporary workers being hired would
probably be reduced. As a result, the rate o f converted temporary contracts to
previous temporary contracts would likely increase as the ratio o f temporary to
permanent work wages rise.
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With respect to dismissal costs, higher permanent workers’ firing costs are
expected to reduce employers’ motivations to convert temporary workers’ status to
permanent to avoid such high costs in the future.
Since employers’ temporary employment practices are strongly governed by
their need to accommodate fluctuations in their workload or regular staff, we would
expect their employment expectations to significantly determine their decision to
promote temporary workers to a permanent status. For example, employment growth
expectations would be expected to result in a higher conversion rate of contracts from
temporary to permanent in order to ensure the required workforce to meet the
expected increases in demand. This is particularly the case when the increase in
demand is expected to be short-lived, i.e. for the next 3 months versus for next year.
Additionally, Spanish unions have traditionally play an important role in the
country’s employment policy. Their active participation in the provision of employers’
incentives that would promote job security suggests a positive relationship between
collective bargaining at the establishment and employers’ contract conversions from a
temporary to a permanent status.
Finally, a higher unemployment rate augments the supply of workers willing to
accept temporary contracts’ terms and the probability of dismissal of permanent
workers. The increasing supply of temporary workers enlarges the employer’s pool of
potential employees and reduces his/her need to retain temporary workers by
transforming their contract. Similarly, by increasing the probability of dismissal of
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permanent workers and the employer’s firing costs, high unemployment rates reduce
employers' motivations to convert temporary jobs to permanent work arrangements.

The Proportion of Temporary Workers at the Establishment

Since the duration o f temporary contracts is commonly exhausted under high
unemployment rates, the establishment’s proportion o f temporary workers depends on
its hiring of new temporary workers, its conversion flow from “temp to perm”, and
permanent workers’ attrition due to firing, quitting and retirement. Thus, it can be
specified as follows:

(1 5 )

^PROPORTION OF TEMPORARY WORKERS = ( N t / N ) —

=fimction of {new hiring flows, conversion flows, attrition}.

Taking permanent workers’ attrition rates as fixed, we can model the
proportion o f temporary workers at the establishment as a function o f new hiring of
temporary workers and “temp to perm” conversion flows. Since both flows depend on
the expected marginal cost of hiring and firing temporary versus permanent workers,
employment expectations, workers’ representation at the establishment and regional
unemployment rates, controlling for establishment characteristics, I can specify the
establishment’s proportion of temporary workers as follows:

(

16)

^ p r o p o r t io n o f t e m p o r a r y w o r k e r s = ( N t / N ) =
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= function of {[Wp + cf(.)], W-r, m, employment expectations, collective
bargaining and unemployment rates affecting f(.)}.

Various testable hypotheses are derived from equation (16) for the variables
included in the analysis. To capture the effect of employment costs, the model
includes the proportion of dismissals ruled unfair by the Labor Courts in a given year
and the wage ratio o f temporary and permanent workers. The proportion of
permanent workers’ dismissals ruled unfair by the Labor Courts raises the employer’s
severance payments. Since temporary workers cannot sue their employers in the event
of being dismissed, increasing firing costs associated with permanent workers’ unfair
dismissals might result in a higher proportion of temporary employees in the
workforce. On the contrary, ceteris paribus, a higher ratio of temporary to permanent
work wages is expected to reduce the proportion of temporary workers in the
establishment’s workforce.
Provided the importance of unions in the Spanish labor market development,
unions-’ negotiations could have a significant impact on the proportion of temporary
workers at the establishment through their effect on the probability of dismissal of
permanent workers f(.) and the relative hiring costs o f temporary versus permanent
employees. The latter is particularly true for Spanish unions, which bargain over both
wages and employment levels provided the traditionally high unemployment rate.
Since wage differentials on the basis of the type of contract are forbidden de iure,
unions’ bargaining over wages for both types of workers should result, in any event, in
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a reduction o f the proportion o f temporary workers at the establishment provided
temporary workers’ lower productivity (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993).
On the other hand, unions bargaining over employment conditions ensuring a
lower probability o f dismissal for its members, particularly permanent workers who
constitute a majority and enjoy higher institutional recognition and control over
workers’ representatives, would be expected to accentuate employers’ reliance on
temporary employment. Indeed, increased job security raises dismissal costs for
permanent workers, thus makes temporary workers more attractive to the employer,
favoring an increase in the proportion of temporary workers being hired.
Consequently, whether the proportion of temporary workers at the establishment is
directly or inversely linked to the presence of collective will depend on which of the
latter effects dominates in the empirical analysis.
Employers’ employment expectations during the previous quarter and year are
also included as proxies o f their future demands. Establishments subject to fluctuating
demands (increasing or decreasing) might be more prone to maintain a larger
proportion o f temporary workers to meet workload fluctuations. Temporary workers
can quickly occupy vacancies from maternity and sick leaves, and they can be easily
and less costly dismissed in the event they are not further needed.
Finally, regional unemployment rates are incorporated to the analysis to control
for labor and production market forces. The unemployment rate controls for the
excess supply o f workers as a decisive element explaining establishments’ contingent
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employment. When the unemployment rate is high, jobs are rationed and the employer
can impose the terms of the contract and the corresponding “take-or-Ieave-it” offer,
resulting in an increasing proportion of temporary workers.

Temporary Employment’s Incidence by Establishment Characteristics: Some
Descriptive Evidence
Using the ECL data described in Appendix A, Table 16 reveals the most recent
incidence and distribution o f temporary employment by establishment characteristics
and the need to control for the latter in the regression analysis.
Temporary employment presents a higher incidence in larger establishments.
Nevertheless, the majority o f temporary employees work in small establishments,
which, along with their medium size counterparts, account for most of Spain’s
enterprises.
As argued in numerous studies for the United States labor market,15 temporary
employment’s incidence on establishments for which employers envision changes in
demand and employment levels is also high. The ability to be able to quickly adapt to
changing market conditions appears to constitute a major concern for Spanish
employers. Indeed, up to 94 percent of the establishments holding employment
growth expectations in the near future resort to temporary workers. In addition,
temporary employment’s incidence remains high for establishments with decreasing or
unchanged employment expectations as well. For the above mentioned reasons,
temporary workers appear to be predominantly employed in the more flexible and
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Table 16
Percentage o f Establishments with Temporary Workers and the Distribution of
Temporary Employment by Establishment Characteristics

1996:4
Characteristics

Percent o f Establishments
with Temporary Workers

Distribution

Establishment Size
Small (5 to 25 Workers)

73.6

77.6

Medium (26 to 250
Workers)

89.6

21.1

Large (Above 250
Workers)

87.3

1.3

Employment Expectations
For the Next Three Months:
Increasing

87.4

10.6

Constant

75.2

82.1

Decreasing

78.6

7.2

For the Next Year:
Increasing

82.4

10.1

Constant

76.9

85.2

Decreasing

62.5

4.7
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Table 16— Continued

1996:4
Characteristics

Percent of Establishments
with Temporary Workers

Distribution

Type o f Sector
Public

71.1

3.5

Private

76.8

96.5

Geographic Location
North

78.1

16.5

South

85.8

13.9

Center

74.2

31.0

Islands

79.0

7.2

Collective Bargaining
No Collective Bargaining

71.1

1.3

Collective Bargaining

76.7

98.7

At the Firm Level

70.5

6.3

At a Higher Level

77.2

92.4

Industry
Manufacturing

76.4

27.4

Commerce

72.9

30.4

Construction

86.2

14.7
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Table 16— Continued

1996:4
Characteristics

Percent of Establishments
with Temporary Workers

Distribution

Industry
Services

76.6

27.5

competitive private sector, however their incidence across the Spanish geography is
rather similar.
The effective unionization rate in Spain has remained fairly high since the late
1970s. Approximately 90 and 99 percent of temporary workers in the sample were
employed at establishments offering collectively bargained wages and working
conditions. Furthermore, more than 75 percent of the establishments offering
collectively bargained wages and working conditions at the firm level employ
temporary workers.
Finally, industry wise, temporary employment displays a very high incidence
regardless o f the establishment’s economic activity.
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What Motivates Employers’ Conversion of Temporary Contracts Into Permanent
Contracts and the Proportion o f Temporary Workers in Their Workforce?

Empirical Implementation

The main objective o f the empirical analysis is to test the predictions from the
model and determine which firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables explain
(a) the proportion o f previous temporary contracts that are converted to permanent
contracts, and (b) the proportion o f temporary workers hired by the establishment.
In both instances, a Fixed-Effects16 model capturing differences across survey
units through differences in the constant term is used to identify the economic
variables determining the proportion o f temporary contracts transformed to permanent
and the fraction of temporary workers being hired by each firm given their variability
across establishments. The use o f proportion data in the analysis implies the following
model. According to Cox (1970) and Greene (1993), the observed proportion P;tis an
estimate of the population proportion that can be expressed as 7tit = F(oti + P’X;t),
where a; captures the differences across establishments and X* refers to firm
characteristics and macroeconomic variables included in our sample. The proportion
regression can then be treated as a sampling problem from a Bernoulli population, i.e.

(17)

Pu = F(cti + P’Xjt) + u;t with E(uu) = 0 and Var(uit) = 7tit (1 -7tit)/ni.
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Taking into consideration the fact that F(oti+ P’Zit) is strictly monotonic, we can
obtain its inverse using a Taylor series approximation,

(18)

F l(Pit) = cti+ p’Xu +

where fjt =

) = dF(7Cit)/d7tit.

Equation (18) yields the following heteroskedastic regression:

(19)

F l(Pu) = a j+ P’Xit + ©a with E (© it) = 0 and Var(©it) = F»t( 1-Fit)/nifit2.

We assume a logistic model so as to obtain an easy expression for the inverse function

(20)

Pa = exp(cti + P’Xit)/[l+ exp(cti + P’Xit)] and its logit ln[Pit/( 1-Pit)] = cq + P’Xit.

(Greene, 1993, pp. 653-654)

This yields the following linear equation:

(21)

Yit = ln[Pit/(l-Pit)] = cti + p’Xit + ©it

where Yit is our dependent variable.
Note that the dependent variable: Y;t = ln[Pa/(l-Pu)] is undefined for P;t = 1,
yielding a sample selection problem. In addition, Greene (1993) explains that the
estimation o f the MLEs using proportion data breaks down when P;t = 0 and Pit= 1. I
thus correct for the resulting sample biases when either P* = 0 or P;t = 1 using
Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure.17
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Following Heckman (1976) and Wooldridge (1995), a selection equation of the
likelihood that the firm hired any temporary workers in each quarter of our sample is
first estimated by standard probit. The observed selection indicator is a binary variable
Tit that equals 1when: 0 < Pit < 1. Otherwise, Tit = 0. The following equation is
estimated for each t using standard probit:

(22)

P(Tit = l|Wj) = 3>(8’Wi)

W; coincides with the firm’s characteristics and quarterly macroeconomic
variables in Xi. The predictions from the standard probits are then used to compute
the inverse Mill’s ratio18 (A*), which is subsequently included in the structural
regression to correct for the biases as follows:

(23)

Yit = ln[Pit/(l-Pit)] = «; + P’Xit+ y Ait+ e it

Nevertheless, the error term in equation (23) is heteroskedastic; its
heteroskedasticity deriving from two sources: (1) the use o f proportions data and (2)
the inclusion of the inverse Mill’s ratio amongst the structural equation’s regressors.
In order to be able to do inference, the consistent but inefficient estimates need to be

corrected for heteroskedasticity. I, therefore, use the weights: wu = [niAu(l-Au ) ] I/2
based on the first step estimates for a second step weighted least squares. As a result,
the heteroskedasticity resulting from the use o f proportion data is lessened and the
efficiency of the final estimates improved. Additionally, White’s robust standard
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errors are computed with the purpose o f purifying the standard errors from any
remaining heteroskedasticity resulting from the inclusion of the inverse Mill’s ratio.

Results

Table 17 describes the variables contained in the data described in Appendix A
and used in the following econometric analysis. Their corresponding means and
standard deviations are reported in Table E l in Appendix E. Table 18 displays the
results from estimating a fixed-effects model o f the conversion rate of temporary
contracts into permanent. Changes in the relative cost o f hiring temporary workers or
in permanent workers’ dismissal costs do not appear to significantly affect employers’
conversion rate o f temporary contracts into permanent contracts. The latter result
might be a justification for the observed limited increase in the number of temporary
contracts transformed into permanent contracts following the regulated employers’
social security taxes and permanent workers’ dismissal costs’ reductions in the Royal
Decrees from 1997.
Employment expectations and the presence o f collectively bargained wages and
working conditions at the establishment influence the employer’s conversion of
temporary contracts into permanent ones. In particular, I find that employers with
immediate employment growth expectations are more likely to promote temporary
workers to a permanent status to meet their changing employment demands.
Similarly, the positive coefficient on collective bargaining reveals the active
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Table 17
Summary of Variables
Variable Name

Description

Measurement

Dependent Variable
Proportion of Last
Quarter’s Temporary
Contracts Converted to
Permanent Contracts

Total of contracts
converted to permanent
this period divided by the
total number of temporary
contracts last quarter at the
establishment

Proportion or percentage
o f last quarter’s temporary
contracts converted to
permanent

Proportion of Temporary
Workers at the
Establishment

Total number of temporary
contracts divided by the
total number of contracts
during the current period
at the establishment

Proportion or percentage
o f temporary
contracts/workers at the
establishment

Independent Variables
Employment Costs
Proportion of Dismissals
Ruled Unfair by Labor
Courts Annually

Total number of permanent Proportion or percentage
workers’ dismissals ruled
of permanent workers’
unfair divided by the total
dismissals ruled unfair
no. of dismissals brought
to the attention o f Labor
Courts annually

( W temp/ W perm )

Ratio of temporary to
permanent work wages

“Temp to perm” wage
ratio by industry

Establishment’s Characteristics
North, South, Center,
Islands

Establishment’s geographic Dummy variables
location
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Table 17—Continued
Variable Name

Description

Measurement

Manufacturing,
Construction, Commerce,
Service

Industry to which the
establishment belongs to

Dummy variables

Small, Large, Medium

Firm size by number of
workers: 5-25, 26-250,
and more than 250

Dummy variables

Employment Expectations
for the Next Three Months
During the Previous
Quarter

Establishment’s
employment expectations
during the previous quarter
for the current period

Expected percentage
decline or increase of the
establishment’s workforce
during the previous quarter

Employment Expectations
for the Next Twelve
Months During the
Previous Year

Establishment’s
employment expectations
during the previous year
for the current period

Expected percentage
decline or increase of the
establishment’s workforce
during the previous year

Collective Bargaining at
the Establishment

Whether the
establishment’s wages and
working conditions are set
through a collective
agreement

Dummy variable

Macroeconomic Trends
Regional Unemployment
Rates

Unemployment rate by
geographic region

Unemployment rate by
region

Fist, Second,...Fourth
Quarter o f the Year

Quarters o f the Year

Dummy variables

Year 1991, ..., 1996

Year

Dummy variables
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Table 18
Fixed-Effects Model o f the Conversion Rate o f Temporary Contracts Into Permanent
Contracts

Coefficients
Independent Variables

Robust Si
Errors

Employment Costs
Proportion o f Dismissals Ruled Unfair by Labor Courts
Annually
( W je m p / W perm )

-0.012

0.266

8.097

7.140

0.002**

0.001

-0.001

0.001

Employment Expectations
Employment Expectations for Next Three Months
During the Previous Quarter
Employment Expectations for the Next Twelve Months
During the Previous Year

Labor Market Relations and the Unemployment Rate
0.176***

0.042

-0.013

0.009

-0.055***

0.020

-0.034*

0.019

-0.127***

0.019

Year 1992

0.028

0.130

Year 1993

0.032

0.133

Year 1994

0.090

0.138

Collective Bargaining at the Establishment
Regional Unemployment Rates
First Quarter o f the Year
Second Quarter of the Year
Third Quarter o f the Year
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Table 18— Continued

Coefficients

Robust Std.
Errors

Year 1995

1.516

0.926

Year 1996

1.621*

0.926

-0.228*

0.089

Independent Variables

X
N =19257

R2 = 0.0342

F(24, 19234) = 26.47

Prob > F = 0.000

Note: The regression analysis controls for the establishment size, industry, sector and
geographic location. The fourth quarter and the year 1991 are used as reference
categories. An intercept was also included in the regression equation. ***
Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, and
*statistically significant at the 10 % level.

role played by unions in promoting job security through the provision of incentives
targeting employers’ rate of conversion of temporary contracts into permanent
contracts.
The year dummies indicate that employers’ conversions o f temporary contracts
into permanent contracts became significantly greater than that o f 1991 in the year
1996, in the midst o f the ongoing economic recovery. Finally, the X term is an
estimate of the covariance between unmeasured factors in the selection equation anch
unmeasured factors in the structural equation. In our case, X is significant and
negative, which confirms the presence of a negative sample selection bias in the
structural model’s estimation. Consequently, unmeasured factors, such as the loss of
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flexibility the employer experiences as a result o f the “temp to perm” conversion, have
a negative effect on the proportion o f temporary contracts employers might convert to
a permanent status.
The coefficients and robust standard errors from the Fixed-Effects model of
the proportions of temporary workers that firms hire are shown in Table 19.
Employment costs constitute a significant determinant of the proportion o f temporary
workers employers might consider hiring.
Specifically, a higher proportion o f unfair permanent workers’ dismissals
during the previous year increases the employer’s current firing costs. Because it is
more difficult and expensive to dismiss permanent workers, employers might opt to
maintain a larger proportion o f temporary workers.
In addition, as it has been hypothesized, the ratio of temporary to permanent
work wages is inversely related to the proportion of temporary being workers hired.
An increase in permanent workers’ wages, ceteris paribus, lowers the relative cost of
hiring temporary workers and promotes an increase in the proportion o f temporary
workers in the workforce.
The need to quickly adapt to ongoing fluctuations in the workload due to
market factors, vacancies, leaves, and special functions is recognized as one o f the
main reasons for employers to hire workers on a temporary basis, along with
employment costs. Indeed, those establishments in the sample holding short run
employment growth expectations, thus apparently exposed to immediate changes in
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Table 19
Fixed-Effects Model o f the Proportion o f Temporary Workers at the Establishment

Independent Variables

Coefficients

Robust Standard
Errors

Employment Costs
Proportion of Dismissals Ruled Unfair by
Labor Courts Annually

0.782***

0.103

(WtempAVperm)

-4.783***

1.216

Employment Expectations
Employment Expectations for the Next Three
Months During the Previous Quarter
Employment Expectations for the Next
Twelve Months During the Previous Year

0.003***

3. le-04

4.9e-04

3.1 e-04

Labor Market Relations and the Unemployment Rate
-0.155***

0.022

Regional Unemployment Rates

0.008**

0.003

First Quarter o f the Year

0.103***

0.007

Second Quarter o f the Year

0.124***

0.007

Third Quarter of the Year

0.091***

0.007

Year 1992

0.012

0.025

Year 1993

-0.273***

0.027

Year 1994

-0.326***

0.031

Collective Bargaining at the Establishment
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Table 19—Continued

Coefficients

Robust Standard
Errors

Year 1995

-1.113***

0.162

Year 1996

-1.241***

0.163

X

0.138***

0.034

Independent Variables

Regression Fit Statistics
N =96536

R2 = 0.069

F (24, 96511) = 174.44

Prob > F = 0.0000

Note: The regression analysis controls for the establishment size, industry, sector and
geographic location. The fourth quarter and the year 1991 are used as reference
categorie. An intercept was also included in the regression equation. *** Statistically
significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, and *statistically
significant at the 10 % level.

demand, are more likely to maintain a greater fraction o f their workforce on temporary
contracts. Nevertheless, long run employment growth expectations do not appear to
play such an important role in the establishment’s proportion of temporary workers.
The empirical estimates for the effect of collective bargaining on the proportion
of temporary workers being hired by the employer indicate that the effect o f increased
bargained wages for all workers and enhanced job security for permanent workers is a
reduction o f the proportion o f temporary employees at the establishment. On the
contrary, higher unemployment rates increase the number of jobs rationed in the
economy and employers’ ability to impose the type o f contract with a “take-or-leave-
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it” offer. Furthermore, high unemployment rates are indicative of greater demand
uncertainty and employers’ larger likelihood of relying on temporary employment.
Consequently, the proportion of temporary contracts rises under high unemployment.
Finally, X is significant and positive, which confirms the presence of a positive
sample selection bias in the structural model’s estimation. Therefore, unmeasured
factors, such as the staffing flexibility and convenience provided by temporary
employees when special projects and emergency fill-ins emerge, have a positive effect
on the proportion o f temporary workers employers might consider hiring.

Conclusion

This chapter adds to the existing literature on temporary employment by
examining the demand side of Spanish temporary employment and the extent to which
hiring and dismissal costs, employment expectations, workers’ representation and high
unemployment rates explain Spanish employers’ temporary employment practices over
the decade.
Spanish unions, employers’ organizations and the Government, concerned
about the proportions reached by temporary employment and its potential effect on job
stability, negotiated various firm incentives to promote the conversion of temporary
contracts into permanent work arrangements. Nonetheless, the latter did not have a
significant effect on contracts’ conversion rate. I thus examine employers’ conversion
from “temp to perm” with the purpose of improving our understanding on its
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determinants for the future design of more effective policies. Although, employers’
reliance on temporary workers appears to be significantly affected by the relative costs
of hiring temporary versus permanent workers and the dismissal costs of the latter,
their temporary contracts’ conversions do not. This finding might contribute to the
evidenced inefficacy o f the regulated reductions in social security taxes and permanent
workers’ dismissal costs in promoting employers’ conversion o f temporary contracts
into permanent contracts. However, such conversions are primarily responsive to
employers’ immediate employment expectations and the presence o f collective
bargaining at the firm. In particular, higher employment growth expectations and the
presence of collective bargaining at the establishment both increase the conversion rate
of temporary contracts into permanent contracts. Year dummies indicate that
employers’ conversions of temporary contracts into permanent contracts has been
significantly larger in 1996 than in 1991, possibly as a result o f the increasing
confidence accompanying the onset economic recovery.
Similarly, the still high proportion o f temporary workers per surveyed
establishment is directly linked to the employer’s employment growth expectations,
but negatively affected by unions’ bargaining over wages. In addition, regional
unemployment rates, signaling demand growth, increase the proportion of temporary
workers at the establishment.
Summarizing, demand-led factors play an important role in workers’ transitions
from “temp to perm” as well as on the proportions reached by temporary employment.
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Spanish temporary employment is driven by employers’ flexibility needs to meet
fluctuations in demand in a labor market characterized by high unemployment rates
and prohibiting dismissal costs for permanent workers. Additionally, since temporary
employment was encouraged by public policy to increase labor flexibility and lower the
traditionally high Spanish unemployment rate, labor market institutions have much to
do with the growth o f temporary employment. As a result, policy measures targeting
to limit temporary employment should take under consideration labor unions’ clout in
the negotiation o f increasing job security for its members, particularly permanent
employees, which might help explaining the still high reliance o f employers on
temporary employees.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The rapid growth and proportion reached by Spanish temporary employment
have captured the public interest during the last decade. Spanish unions, who at first
supported the deregulation o f temporary employment as a means to reduce the high
unemployment rate, have become alarmed by the extent and precariousness associated
with temporary employment. Therefore, labor unions have actively promoted and
participated in tripartite agreements with the employers’ organizations and the
Government, whose main purpose has been to control the expansion o f contingent
work arrangements. In particular, two Royal Decrees have captured the essence of
such negotiations, the Royal Decrees-Law 8/97 and 9/97. They both promote
employment stability by providing employers with social security and severance
payment savings when they convert old temporary contracts into permanent ones or
when they hire workers using any o f the new open-ended contractual arrangements.
Provided unions’ concern over the efficiency of temporary employment as a
vehicle towards permanent and non-contingent employment, this research examines
temporary workers’ transitions into and out of temporary employment and their
likelihood o f receiving an open-ended job offer. The analysis first uncovers the
involuntary nature o f temporary employment in the Spanish case as only 0.4 percent of
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temporary workers admit to have been actually looking for such a temporary job.
Additionally, I find that entrance into a temporary work arrangement is strongly
influenced by previous labor force statuses, with temporary workers holding the
highest likelihood of perpetuating their status. Furthermore, the study reveals
temporary workers’ low job mobility, particularly to permanent work arrangements.
In particular, women, youths, less educated workers and tenured workers share a
lower likelihood of exiting temporary employment and obtaining a permanent work
status. Consequently, temporary employment serves more as a trap than a bridge
towards secure and stable employment.
In addition, the inefficacy o f the firm incentives regulated in the RD Laws 8
and 9/1997 promoting the conversion of temporary contracts and reducing the
percentage o f the Spanish labor force on temporary contracts from 1997 to 1998
(which amounted to 33.6 in 1997 and reduced to just 33.0 percent in 1998—BME,
INE), suggest the need of improving our understanding of employers’ temporary
employment practices. Furthermore, since temporary employment displays a rather
involuntary nature and demand-led character, to effectively promote stable
employment it is necessary to identify the determinants of employers’ hiring practices,
in particular their contribution to temporary workers’ promotion to an indefinite status
and the degree o f their reliance on temporary employment. Nonetheless, before
starting such a task, we familiarize ourselves with the Spanish labor market and the
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situation Spanish authorities regarded as worrisome in the enactment of Laws 8 and 9
in 1997.
Chapter IV examines the net and gross employment flows in the Spanish labor
market and the relative contribution to net employment creation of temporary versus
permanent employment from 1990 through 1996. The descriptive analysis uncovers
the existence of simultaneous job creation, job destruction and large job and worker
reallocation flows for overall employment in 1993-1994, probably caused by the
fluctuations experienced in temporary employment during the same period o f time.
The job instability reflected by temporary employment fluctuations likely contributed
to Spanish authorities’ awareness over the effects that increased flexibility at the

margin has had on unemployment and the labor market.
Despite the adopted policy measures in 1997, the conversion rate o f temporary
contracts into permanent contracts and the percentage o f the Spanish workforce on
temporary work arrangements have barely changed. As a result, exploring and
identifying their determinants guards a significant policy value. Chapter V thus
focuses on the analysis of employers’ hiring patterns and their input in facilitating
temporary workers’ transition to permanent jobs through the conversion o f temporary
contracts into permanent contracts. I find that employers’ contract conversion rates
were, on average, 3 percent from 1990 through 1996. A closer look at conversion
rates reveals their dependency on employers’ immediate employment expectations and
collective bargaining.
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In addition to low conversion rates, Spanish unions have denounced the still
high percentage o f the labor force under temporary contracts during much of 1998.
Therefore, the analysis explored the incidence o f temporary employment by
establishment characteristics and the demand-side determinants o f the proportion of
temporary workers being hired at most establishments. Aside from the above
mentioned factors determining employers’ contract conversions, the study uncovers
the importance o f the relative hiring costs o f temporary versus permanent workers and
the dismissal costs for the latter in explaining the proportion of temporary workers.
Consequently, this research reveals that Spanish temporary employment,
mostly demand-led, is driven by employers’ flexibility needs to meet fluctuations in
demand in a labor market characterized by high unemployment rates and prohibiting
dismissal costs for permanent workers. Additionally, since temporary employment
was encouraged by public policy to increase labor flexibility and lower the traditionally
high Spanish unemployment rate, labor market institutions have much to do with the
growth o f temporary employment. In particular, policy measures targeting to limit
temporary employment should be aware of labor unions’ clout in the negotiation of
increasing job security for permanent employees and how their influence might
partially be responsible for the persistently high reliance o f employers on temporary
employment.
Some lessons can be drawn form the concluded analysis. First o f all, the
importance of examining economic trends, labor institutions and the legal framework
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to improve our understanding o f Spanish temporary employment, as well as any other
work-arrangements.
Second, deregulating temporary employment and increasing labor flexibility at

the margin, through measures exclusively affecting temporary contracts’ terms and
requirements, is likely to result in a segmented labor force with reduced workers’
mobility across labor force status.
Lastly, if high unemployment rates and large dismissal costs’ differentials
between temporary and permanent workers are added in, temporary employment is
likely to grow rapidly. Employers will rely on the opportunity of being able to hire and
cheaply dismiss temporary workers to accommodate fluctuations in their demands.
Since temporary employment might help create employment in a rigid labor market
characterized by high hiring and firing costs for permanent workers as well as high
unemployment rates, reaching the appropriate balance of flexibility and deregulation of
temporary employment, as well as that o f permanent employment, becomes a difficult
task.
An interesting avenue for future research will be the evaluation o f the effect
that severance payment and social security reductions for temporary contracts
converted to permanent ones granted by the Royal Decrees of 8/97 and 9/97 might
have on increasing employment stability over their four year probationary period. At
the present moment, although the measures appear to have helped to create more than
100,000 permanent contracts (ABC, Diario de Economfa, April 4, 1998), their effect
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on the conversion o f temporary contracts into permanent contracts and on the
proportion of the workforce on temporary contracts has been hardly noticed. In any
event, institutional modifications made only at the margin, such as those observed by
the 1997 labor reform, may only aggravate the dual labor character already displayed
by Spanish temporary employment. In this vein, Alba-Ramirez (1997, p.20) explains
that, in the long run: “A reduction of the indefinite contract rigidity, should foster
long-term employment relationships in Spain.”
Similarly, Jimeno and Toharia (1994) argue that it could be advisable to
directly reduce the rigidity affecting the core of workers, that is, permanent
employees’ advance notice, severance pay, and so on. Saint-Paul (1993) points
towards the fact that the existence of a dual labor market might facilitate the adoption
of such flexibility measures affecting core workers as the coalition of both temporary
and unemployed workers grows in size. As noticed by Jimeno and Toharia (1993),
this could well be the Spanish case, where temporary employment accounts for
roughly a third of the working age population and unemployment for approximately 2 0
percent. Nonetheless, increasing permanent workers’ flexibility could have both
positive and negative effects, depending on whether employers pass their higher
dismissal costs onto their workers in the form of lower wages as well as on other
factors, such as the rate o f economic growth (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). The
widespread assumption in the literature is that employers either increase the number of
hours of work or reduce their workforce in response to higher firing costs. Even in
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the latter case, the desirability o f relaxing dismissal costs for core workers would still
remain unclear. As argued by Bentolila and Bertola (1990, pp.399): “Desirable
employment stabilization has in effect to be traded off against undesirable productive
inefficiency... .”
Indeed, on the one hand, one could argue that deregulating permanent
employment would allow employers to quickly respond to fluctuations in labor
demand, reducing their hiring and firing costs and remaining more competitive.
However, on the other hand, it is difficult to assess whether the high unemployment
rate experienced by the Spanish economy would be improved or worsened by such
measures. If indeed employers enjoy greater flexibility in the dismissal of their
employees, we should expect lower equilibrium employment rates (i.e. even higher
unemployment rates) and larger employment fluctuations over the business cycle
(Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Abraham and Houseman, 1993).
Furthermore, an assessment o f the full impact o f reducing dismissal costs for
core workers will be on employment becomes even harder in the presence o f a dual
labor market. As noted in various comments to Bertola’s (1990) paper, while a
reduction in labor turnover costs may increase employment variability and reduce its
average equilibrium level in the primary sector, it is likely to have the opposite effect in
the secondary sector. Depending on which of the latter effects dominates, an decrease
(increase) in the overall employment equilibrium level and a corresponding increase
(decrease) in variability could result.
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Consequently, a final verdict on whether permanent employment flexibility
guards the solution to the Spanish high unemployment rate and, thus, on its desirability
will only be reached in the long term in the event such measures are undertaken or/and
more detailed analysis is completed. In the meantime, this research has emphasized
some of the adverse effects that deregulation at the margin has had on job mobility
and workers’ advancement and the need to design effective policies to cope and lessen
the economic and social consequences deriving from the development of a dual labor
market. In doing so, the policy maker should be aware o f the importance of labor
institutions, as well as employment expectations and unemployment rates, as revealed
in this research.
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NOTES

1.

Bentolila and Dolado (1994) examine wage differentials between temporary and
permanent workers and their positions in collective bargaining in Spain. Their
analysis reveals the existence o f a dual labor market and some of the economic
consequences it might entail.
2. A extensive literature on the insider-outsider theory o f unemployment (Bentolila
and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1990; Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; Saint-Paul, 1993; and
Bentolila and Dolado, 1994) recommends specific policy measures in the context of a
two-tier labor market, such as increasing labor market flexibility through the
reduction o f rigidities affecting core workers.
3. As a reference, the percentages fixed in 1995 for the various types of contingencies
were the following: (a) for common contingencies, workers and employers under the
general regime contributed 28.3 percent of the worker’s wage base, from which 23.6
percent was paid by the employer and 4.7 percent by the worker, (b) for work
accidents and professional illnesses, employers contributions varied from 50,250
pesetas/month for workers less than 18 years old (approximately $335 at the actual
exchange rate) to 374,880 pesetas/month (about $2,299); (c) for unemployment
contingencies workers and employers under the general regime contributed 7.8
percent of the worker’s wage base, from which 6 .2 percent was paid by the employer
and 1.6 percent by the worker; (d) the Guarantee Wage Fund fee paid by the
employer was 0.4 percent of the employee's wage base; (e) for training
contingencies, the percentage paid amounted to 0.7 percent of the worker's wage
base, from which the employer paid 0 .6 percent and the worker 0.1 percent; and (f)
the percentage for overtime work hours contingencies was generally 28.3 percent,
from which 23.6 percent was paid by the employer and 4.7 percent by the worker,
with the exception o f overtime hours worked in case o f structural changes in the
industry or great need, in which case the percentage was reduced to 14 percent of the
wage base, from which 12 percent was paid by the employer and 2 percent by the
worker.
4. The pension base is computed dividing the sum o f the wage base used to calculate
the social security contributions during the previous 96 months by 112. Wage bases
from the last 24 months enter with their nominal value while the rest of the wage
bases are actualized using the consumer price index.
5. The regulatory base is computed as the mean value o f the bases used in the
calculation o f the contributions to work accidents and professional illness
contingencies during the 180 days previous to becoming unemployed.
150
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6.

A description of the survey variables used in this study and their measurement is
provided in Table 7 before the econometric analysis is completed.

7. For the five outcome multinomial logit being estimated, I estimate a set of
coefficients P(1), P(2), PP), P(4), P(5) corresponding to each outcome category in the
model. In order to identify the model, one o f P(1), p(2), p(3), p(4) or P(5) is set to zero.
In the present case I chose the permanent employment outcome as the base or
reference category, thus P(3) = 0 . The estimated coefficients P(l), P(2), P(4) and P(5)
thus measure the change relative to the y=3 category. The equations o f the
multinomial logit being estimated become:
P(y=l) = exp{XP(1)}/[ exp{Xp(1)}+ exp{XP(2)}+ 1 + exp{Xp(4)}+
exp{XP<5>}],
P(y=2) = exp(Xp,2)}/[ exp{XP'")+ exp{X|3|2)}+ 1 + exp{xp|4>}+
e*p{Xp‘s>}],
P(y=3) = l/[ exp{Xp0>}+ exp{xp(2>}+ 1 + exp{Xp<4)}+
exp{XP(5)}],
P(y=4) = exp{XP<4>}/[ exp{Xp(1|}+ exp{xp<2>)+ 1 + exp{Xp<4)}+
exp{XP(5)}],
P(y=5) = exp{XP(!>)/[ exp{XP(,)}+ exp{XPm l+ 1 + exp{xp(4)}+
exp{XP<5>}].
The relative probability o f y=4 (temporary employment) to the base category (y=3,
permanent employment) is given by:
[P(y=4)/P(y=3)] = exp{XP(4)}
This ratio is called the relative risk or odds ratio. If we suppose that X and P(4) are
vectors equal to (xj, X2, .... Xk) and (Pi, P2, ..., Pk)\ then the odds ratio for a one unit
change in Xi equals exp(Pi(4)}, which captures the risk of temporary employment
relative to permanent employment when there is a one unit change in xl
[Stata-Volume 5, 1997, pg. 542].
8.

Since 1997, the ECL also surveys establishments with fewer than 5 employees.

9. As noted by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), this measure is symmetric about zero
with newly created employment lying to the right and newly destroyed employment
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to the left endpoints, given by the closed interval [-2, 2]. In addition, the growth
measure is a monotonic transformation o f the conventional growth rate measure G
(i.e. G=2g/(2-g)) and it is used as it allows an integrated treatment of newly created,
destroyed and continuing firms.
10. Author’s own tabulations using the Encuesta de Poblacion Activa (EPA).
11. Using data from the National Institute of Employment (INEM), an article from
the EIRR 158 (1987) reports that the percentage of all new contracts in the economy
presenting a fixed-term nature amounted to about 90 percent in 1985. Similarly, in a
later article from EIRR 262 (1995) the average percentage of all new contracts
concluded in the economy with a temporary nature for the decade 1985-1995 was
revealed to amount to 90 percent. Although the data source for this latter statistic was
not clearly identified, I assume it was derived using employment contract data from
the INEM as well.
Data sources and differences are likely to be at the source o f the 5 percent differential
between the reported statistic in the EIRR and the derived statistic using raw data
from the ECL survey:
a) The economic sectors being covered by the ECL survey differ from the
whole economy, as reported in the EIRR. The ECL survey excludes the agriculture
sector and from the service industry, public administrative workers among other
groups o f workers, are not surveyed. Using raw data from the EPA for 1995-1996,1
calculate that approximately 8 percent of all temporary workers in the economy were
in the agriculture industry. The latter represented 56 percent of all agriculture
employees. Public administration temporary workers amounted to 12 percent of all
temporary employees and accounted for 19 percent o f all public administration
employees. If we add to the latter other temporary workers from the service industry
excluded from the survey, we could be potentially ignoring more than 2 0 percent
(1/5) of all temporary workers in the economy, which could augment the estimate
derived using ECL data.
b) The population scope of the ECL data does not include all workers in the
economy either. The ECL is limited to workers affiliated to the General Regime o f
the Social Security and to its Special Regime for mine and coal workers.
Nonetheless, all other workers affiliated to either the Special Social Security Regimes
for agriculture workers, self-employed individuals, home personnel (for cleaning,
cooking, baby sitting, etc...), fishermen, Government workers and members o f
Parliaments o f the Autonomous Communities, all o f who account for up to 30 percent
of all workers affiliated to Social Security in 1991 and 1996, are being excluded from
the ECL survey (INE, 1997). Since many of the workers in these groups tend to work
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temporarily, such as house personnel, the resulting percentage of new contracts
presenting a temporary nature might be biased downward.
c) Finally, the ECL surveys firm establishments with 5 or more employees.
The vast majority of the Spanish entrepreneurial universe appears to be composed of
small and medium size businesses. Their exclusion could also affect downward the
derived estimate, particularly if temporary employment displays a high incidence in
those small establishments.
12. Another revealing statistic frequently mentioned in the literature (i.e. EIRR 236,
1993) is the number of temporary contracts as a percentage o f the total working age
population, which amounted to 32 percent of the latter in 1993. The difference in
magnitude with respect to the provided statistic using the ECL data might be due to
the discussed scope of the survey.
13. Previous studies for the Spanish economy by Jimeno and Toharia (1993) provide
evidence of the negative effect o f fixed-term contracts on workers’ productivity.
14. In fact, the large percentage o f new contracts with a temporary nature could be
interpreted as an indicator o f employers’ constrained hiring due to high dismissal
costs for permanent workers. The latter results in lower equilibrium employment
levels for temporary workers and a higher equilibrium employment level for
permanent workers. Consequently, the equilibrium proportion of temporary contracts
at the establishment may be higher under high dismissal costs for core workers.
In any event, comer solutions with respect to the percentage o f newly hired
workers holding temporary contracts at period t do not necessarily imply the
existence of comer solutions for the conversion of temporary contracts to permanent
contracts one period later neither for the percentage o f temporary workers at the
establishment at time t, on which I focus.
15. See McKay (1988), Way (1988), and Golden and Appelbaum (1992) among
others.
16. Given the fact that there is no justification for treating the individual effects as
uncorrelated with the other regressors as assumed by the Random-Effects model, we
use a Fixed-Effects model that at least ensures unbiased and consistent, if not always
efficient, estimates.
17. Alternatively, we could think o f having censored observations when Pit = 0 or
Pit= 1 and, thus, estimate a Tobit model. Nonetheless, since the Tobit model is
known to produce inconsistent estimates in the presence o f heteroskedasticity and
censoring (Arabmazar and Schmidt, 1982), I opt to correct for the biases using the
inverse Mill’s ratio as suggested by Greene (1993). The basic difference between
using Tobit estimation procedure versus Heckman’s two-step procedure resides in the
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possibility o f including different regressors in the selection and structural equations in
the latter case, while in the former both coincide. The advantage of using Heckman’s
two-step procedure to correct for the sample biases is the fact that it produces
consistent coefficient estimates, while still inefficient in the presence o f
heteroskedasticity. The latter can be corrected using weighted OLS or lessened by
requesting White’s robust errors.
18.

= <j>(Q)/1-<D(Q), where Q=- 5’Wit/[E(tnit2) ] 1/2
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The micro level data employed in the study of temporary employment from a
supply side perspective in chapter III derives from the Encuesta de Poblation Activa,
which is a quarterly survey carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
Madrid. The EPA is the Spanish labor force survey. It is designed to be
representative of the working age population and the questionnaire contains a series
o f questions regarding the labor force status o f the individual.
The EPA has been in existence since the 1960s. However, the questionnaire
only asked each dependent worker about the type of contract held as of the second
quarter of 1987. In addition, the questionnaire contains a variety o f questions about
gender, age, education, civil status, occupation, industry, tenure, and employment and
unemployment history. The data used in this study expands from the second quarter
of 1995 to the second quarter of 1996, allowing us to exploit the information on the
type o f contract, indefinite versus temporary, held by the worker at different points in
time.
The EPA questionnaires are sent quarterly to approximately 64,000
households. Each quarter one sixth o f the sample is renewed, consequently
individuals only stay in the survey for a maximum of six quarters. I matched the EPA
files from 1995:2 to 1996:2 in order to examine workers’ transitions into and out of
temporary employment as well as other labor force statuses. A description of the
survey variables used in the analysis and how they are measured is provided in
Table 7.
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The establishment level data used in the demand side analysis of temporary
employment in chapters IV and V derives from the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral.
This is a quarterly survey carried out by the Ministerio de Seguridad Social y Asuntos
Sociales, Madrid, since the second quarter of 1990 on establishments’ employment
levels and employment expectations. The questionnaires are sent to approximately
8 ,0 0 0

company executives each quarter and the average response rate is high since

the response to the questionnaire is required by the Law 13/1996. The attrition rate is
approximately 8 percent for each quarter. In most instances, establishments drop
from the survey as they conclude their activities or for statistical reasons, such as the
veracity and consistency o f the data being provided, establishments’ ability to provide
answered questionnaires on time, or when they change their characteristics, such as
activity, exiting the survey framework.
The main purpose o f the survey is to compile frequent data on various aspects
of the labor market, such as the composition o f the working labor force, their mobility
and work absences. In addition, some information on collective bargaining at the
firm or industry levels, and the employer’s employment expectations are contained in
the survey. The employment information is referred to those workers registered at the
firm’s unit where they process the information concerning social security
contributions, regardless o f whether they work in one or various of the firm’s
establishments. In many instances, firms count with more than one unit at which they
keep records o f their employees for social security purposes. Consequently, the
survey unit is somewhere in between the firm and the establishment, although, in
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most cases, it coincides with the latter. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, we
will refer to the survey unit as the establishment in despite of their possible
differences.
From 1990 through 1996, the ECL is a quarterly survey o f approximately
8,000 establishments with more than 5 workers each period, from which about

8

percent are renewed each quarter. Nonetheless, since 1997 the ECL also includes
information on establishments with less than 5 employees. The survey is distributed
to establishments according to random sampling. The sample is representative o f the
universe o f establishments within the economic activities being covered by the
survey, which includes the Construction, Industry and Service sectors. It excludes the
Agriculture sector as well as establishments in the Service sector belonging to the
Public Administration, Defense, Social Security, Extraterritorial Organisms and
Religious Organizations. The geographic scope of the survey includes the whole
national territory, with the exception o f Ceuta and Melilla. Finally, the surveyed
population includes salaried workers affiliated to the Social Security General Regime
and the Special Regime for miners and coal workers.
The ECL contains information on the labor force composition o f the
establishment by gender and type of contracts, as well as on contract renewals and
contract conversions, work absences and the reasons for the latter, industrial relation
practices and employment expectations for the next 3 months and year. The sample
used in this study ranges from the second quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter o f
1996.
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Table 17 contains a description o f the survey variables used in the analysis
and their measurement. The most noteworthy shortcoming o f the survey is the lack
of any financial information on the survey units, including wages and dismissal costs.
To supplement this lack, for the analysis in Chapter IV, I use the percentage of
dismissals ruled unfair by the Labor Courts annually and annual ratios of temporary
to permanent work wages for each industry classification. In particular, the
percentage of permanent workers’ dismissals ruled in favor of the worker is used to
proxy for additional firing costs o f permanent workers. The higher the proportion of
permanent workers’ dismissals found unfair by the Labor Courts, the higher the
firm’s severance payments. The latter increase from the usual 20 days-wage salary
per year of tenure with a maximum of 12 months, to 45 days-wage salary per year of
tenure with a maximum o f 42 months.
Additionally, the data contains regional unemployment rates to account for
their effect on firms’ employment practices and use o f temporary workers.
Hiring and dismissal costs variables added to the original micro level data
were obtained from the Boletin Mensual de Estadistica, made available by the
Institute Nacional de Estadistica, Madrid. The exceptions is the regional
unemployment rate, which was obtained from the Encuesta de Poblacidn Activa, also
made available by the Institute Nacional de Estadistica, Madrid. In both cases, the
series extend from the second quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 1996, as the
establishment level data does.
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Table B1
Means and Standard Deviations o f Variables in Multinomial Logit and Duration
Model
Variable Name

Mean

Standard Deviation

Unemployed-95

0.1318

0.3383

Out o f the LF-95

0. 4022

0.4904

Temporary-95

0.11 47

0.3187

Permanent-95

0.2336

0.4231

Other Occupation-95

0.1176

0.3221

Female

0. 5054

0.5000

Age 16

0.1033

0.3043

Age20

0.1228

0.3283

Age25

0.0991

0.2989

Age30

0.1031

0.3041

Age35

0.1070

0.3091

Age40

0 .1 0 0 1

0.3001

Age45

0.1045

0.3060

Age50

0.0873

0.2823

Age55

0.0803

0.2717

Age60

0.0924

0.2896

Main Person

0.3344

0.4718

Partner

0.3042

0.4601
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Table B 1—Continued
Variable Name

Mean

Standard Deviation

Son

0.3261

0.4688

Other Person

0.0353

0.1845

Married

0.6089

0.4880

Primary Studies

0.4423

0.4967

Secondary Studies

0.3610

0.4803

Higher Education

0.1967

0.3975

Unemployed-primary

0.0475

0.2126

Unemployed-secondary

0.0544

0.2268

Unemployed-higher

0.0299

0.1705

Out of the LF-primary

0.0636

0.4071

Out of the LF-secondary

0.0345

0.3573

Out of the LF-higher

0.0196

0.2014

Temp-primary

0.0391

0.1938

Temp-secondary

0.0474

0.2126

Temp-higher

0.0636

0.1655

Perm-primary

0.0825

0.2751

Perm-secondary

0.0745

0.2626

Perm-higher

0.0766

0.2659

Other occupation-primary

0.0636

0.2440
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Table B1— Continued
Variable Name

Mean

Standard Deviation

Other occupationsecondary

0.0345

0.1823

Other occupation-higher

0.0196

0.1385

Agriculture

0.0410

0.1982

Industry

0.0945

0.2926

Construction

0.0448

0.2069

Services

0.2856

0.4517

Temp-agriculture

0.0074

0.0859

Temp-industry

0.0225

0.1483

Temp-construction

0.223

0.1478

Temp-service

0.0624

0.2419

Perm-agriculture

0.0064

0.0796

Perm-industry

0.0586

0.2349

Perm-construction

0.0116

0.1071

Perm-service

0.1570

0.3638

Occupation Otheragriculture

0.271

0.1625

Occupation Other-industry

0.134

0.1151

Occupation Otherconstruction

0.109

0.1037

Occupation Other-service

0.0662

0.2486
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Table B 1—Continued
Variable Name

Mean

Standard Deviation

Managers

0.0405

0.0587

Technicians, Professionals

0.0818

0.3046

Administrative Workers

0.0427

0.2768

Sales and Services
Workers

0.0647

0.3843

Agriculture Workers

0.0321

0.1644

Manufacturing and
Construction Workers

0.1354

0.4689

Non-qualified Workers

0.0665

0.4463

Seasonal

0.0238

0.1526

Full-time

0.8809

0.3239

Public

0.1061

0.3080

Tenure

55.7520

104.1688

Tenure Square

13959.14

36924.17

Employment Office &
Subsidy

0.0450

0.2073

Employment Office & No
Subsidy

0.1162

0.3204

Unregistered in the
Employment Office

0.8377

0.3687

Search

0.0750

0.2634
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The various age, education, gender and activity groups’ codes employed in the
estimation of the Cox proportional hazard models and in the equality tests o f survivor
functions should be interpreted as follows:
Age=l: 16 to 30 year old;

Gender=I: female;

Age=2: 31 to 45 year old;

Gender=6 : male;

Age=3: 46 years old and above;

Activity=l: Agriculture;

Education=l: primary education;

Activity=2: Industry;

Education=2: secondary education;

Activity=3: Construction;

Education=3: University and professional;

Activity=4: Service;

EQUALITY TESTS FOR NON-PARTICIPATION SURVIVOR FUNCTIONS:
Log-rank test for equality o f survivor functions

age | observed

expected

1

192
149
36

201.39
144.33
31.29

Total |

377

377.00

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

1.44
0.4862

1
2

1
1

3
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| Events
edu | observed
1

1

2

1

expected

156
136
85

133.01
151.98
92.01

377

377.00

chi2 ( 2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

6.55
0.0379

3

1
-K
Total |

| Events
activity | observed

expected

. 4-

3
4

|
j
|
|

222

29.74
74.13
68.84
204.30

Total

|

377

377.00

chi2(3)=
Pr>chi2 =

25.71

1
2

46
70
39

| Events
gender | observed
1
6

1
1

Total |

0 .0 0 0 0

expected

150
227

233.48
143.52

377

377.00

chi2 ( l ) =
Pr>chi2 =

81.24
0 .0 0 0 0

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

168
EQUALITY TESTS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT SURVIVOR FUNCTIONS
Log-rank test for equality o f survivor functions

| Events
age | observed

expected

1
2

1
1

738
507

3

1

102

728.82
514.80
103.38

1347

1347.00

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

0.29
0.8649

Total |

| Events
edu | observed
.

expected

4- . .

1
2

1
1

3

|

509
527
311

469.01
549.00
328.99

1347

1347.00

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

5.99
0.0499

Total |

| Events
activity | observed

expectt

j.

3
4

|
|
|
|

156
205
293
693

267.02
246.07
732.78

Total

|

1347

1347.00

1
2

chi2(3)=
Pr>chi2 =

1 0 1 .1 2

63.97
0 .0 0 0 0
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| Events
gender | observed

expected

+ -------------------------------

1

| 836
| 511

6

834.48
512.52

+ -------------------------------

Total | 1347
chi2 ( 1 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

1347.00
0 .0 1

0.9278

EQUALITY TESTS FOR TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SURVIVOR
FUNCTIONS:
Log-rank test for equality o f survivor functions

| Events
age | observed
1
2
3

|
|
|

Total |

2468
1493
271

expected
2339.35
1592.71
299.94

4232

4232.00

chi2(2) =
Pr>chi2 =

20.73
0.0000

| Events
edu | observed

expected

1
2
3

|
|
|

1365
1837
1030

1423.25
1758.04
1050.71

Total |

4232

4232.00

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

8.06
0.0178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

| Events
activity | observed
.+
1
|
298
2
|
927
3
|
699
4
|
2308
.+
Total | 4232
chi2(3) =
Pr>chi2 =
| Events
gender| observed
-+
2705
1
1
1527
6
1
+.
Total | 4232
chi2 ( l ) =
Pr>chi2 =

expected
256.85
859.16
811.05
2304.93
4232.00
35.10
0 .0 0 0 0

expected
2634.65
1597.35
4232.00
6.32
0.0119

EOUALITY TESTS FOR PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT
FUNCTIONS:
Log-rank test for equality o f survivor functions

| Events
age | observed

expected

4-

1
2

3

1

I
1

Total |

108
79
8

104.06
76.70
14.24

195

195.00

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

3.00
0.2233
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| Events
edu | observed
+■
37
1
1
84
2
1
74
3
1

65.74
79.66
49.59

Total |

195

195.00

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =

25.21

expected

-

| Events
activity | observed

|

1
2
3
4

Total

|
|
|
|

expected

6
45
16
128

10.02
38.79
38.46
107.73

195

195.00

chi2(3)=
Pr>chi2 =

19.83
0.0002

| Events
gender | observed
1

0 .0 0 0 0

expected

6

| 118
I 77

120.84
74.16

Total

|

195

195.00

chi2 (l) =
Pr>chi2 =

0.18
0.6732
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EQUALITY TESTS FOR OTHER OCCUPATIONS SURVIVOR FUNCTIONS:
Log-rank test for equality o f survivor functions

| Events
age | observed
1
2

1
1

3

1

__ -f

expected

34

31.54
21.35
4.11

21
2

57

Total |

57.00
1.30
0.5210

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =
| Events
edu | observed

2

1
1

3

1

16
26
15

Total |

57

I

expected
19.65
23.54
13.82
57.00
1.05
0.5925

chi2 (2 ) =
Pr>chi2 =
| Events
activity | observed
1

1

6

2

1

3
4

1

13
16

|
+
Total 1

expected
4.44
11.43
10.62
30.51

22
-

- -

57
chi2(3) =
Pr>chi2 =

-

57.00
5.91
0.1160
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| Events
gender | observed
1
6

Total |

|
I

expected

45
12

35.44
21.56

57

57.00

chi2( 1) =
Pr>chi2 =

6.84
0.0089
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Appendix D
Baseline Hazard Functions
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The various age, education, gender and activity groups’ codes employed in the
estimation of the Cox proportional hazard models by various covariates should be
interpreted as follows:
Age=l: 16 to 30 year old;

Gender= 1: female;

Age=2: 31 to 45 year old;

Gender=6 : male;

Age=3: 46 years old and above;

Activity=l: Agriculture;

Education=l: primary education;

Activity=2: Industry;

Education=2: secondary education;

Activity=3: Construction;

Education=3: University and professional;

Activity=4: Service;

Baseline hazard functions graphed by each covariate (or group) for which the
baseline survivor functions significantly differ are presented below. The horizontal
axis measures the tenure of the temporary worker at his/her job. Grids are set at 1,
12, 36, 60, etc..., months of tenure. The vertical axis captures the likelihood of exit
faced by the temporary worker at a point in time provided an exit has not occurred
yet. The purpose of displaying these graphs is to illustrate the sensitivity o f the
baseline hazards to different values o f the covariates. The baseline hazards are
grouped by type of labor force exit considered in the Cox proportional hazard model,
and they are being presented in the same order followed in the discussion o f the
model estimation results in Table 9.
To serve as an example o f the interpretation of these hazards, I will comment
on the baseline hazards for the first outcome in the model: transitions from temporary
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employment to non-participation. Since the baseline survivor functions for the non
participation outcome differed by gender, education and activity, the baseline hazards
are graphed separately for the values of the three covariates. Different exit patterns
are, indeed, revealed when graphing the baseline hazards for the different values of
the covariates. I first comment on the baseline hazards for the non-participation
outcome by gender. While female temporary workers appear to exit the workforce
any time within the first three years o f tenure, male temporary workers spread their
exits over time; some of them do not exit the workforce until they have reached a

10

years’ tenure. In addition, their hazard rates display a wider range of values.
When examining baseline hazards by temporary workers’ educational
attainment, less educated temporary workers appear more likely to exit the workforce
than university graduates (edu= 3). The latter experience a probability of exiting to
non-participation below 40 percent at all tenures. Furthermore, temporary workers
with a primary education ( e d u = l) endure a longer lasting risk of exiting the
workforce then their more educated counterparts.
Finally, labor force exit patterns also differ by industry. Temporary workers’
exits out of the workforce primarily take place within the first year of tenure. Exits
are particularly concentrated in the agriculture sector, where hazard rates for non
participation appear the largest. On the contrary, out o f the workforce hazards are the
lowest in the construction industry. Lastly, temporary workers in the service industry
endure the longer lasting risk o f non-participation exits o f the four industries.
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In general, the graphs confirm the sensitivity o f the baseline hazards to the
different values o f the covariates and the need to interpret baseline functions with
caution. The subsequent baseline hazards for the different values of the covariates
and model outcomes can be similarly interpreted. A noteworthy fact is the
substantially temporary workers’ lower likelihood of finding a permanent or non
salaried job relative to new temporary employment, regardless o f the values o f the
covariates for which the baseline hazards are being graphed. These differences are
discussed using the general baseline hazards for each outcome, which are displayed
Figures 6 to 10 in Chapter HI.

BASELINE HAZARD FUNCTIONS FOR THE NON-PARTICIPATION
OUTCOME:
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BASELINE HAZARD FUNCTIONS FOR THE UNEMPLOYMENT OUTCOME:
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BASELINE HAZARD FUNCTIONS FOR THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT
OUTCOME:
age==2
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BASELINE HAZARD FUNCTIONS FOR THE PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT
OUTCOME:
edu==1
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BASELINE HAZARD FUNCTION FOR THE NON-SALARIED WORK
OUTCOME:
gender==6
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Appendix E
Means and Standard Deviation of Variables Used in the
Establishment Level Data Analysis
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Table El
Means and Standard Deviation o f Variables in Establishment Level Data
Variable Name

Mean

Standard Deviation

Proportion of Dismissals
Ruled Unfair by Labor
Courts Annually

0.3376

0.0416

0.5453

0.0654

North

0.3764

0.4845

South

0.0874

0.2825

Center

0.4552

0.4980

Islands

0.0810

0.2728

Manufacturing

0.3397

0.4736

Construction

0.1217

0.3270

Commerce

0.2231

0.4163

Service

0.3154

0.4647

Small

0.3717

0.4833

Medium

0.4272

0.4947

Large

0 .2 0 1 1

0.4009

Public

0.1128

0.3163

Private

0.8867

0.3169

Employment Expectations
for Next Three Months
During Previous Quarter

-0.0559

18.0697

(W temp / W perm )
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Table E l—Continued
Mean

Standard Deviation

Employment Expectations
for the Next Twelve
Months During the
Previous Year

-0.1960

17.5877

Collective Bargaining at
the Establishment

0.9534

0.2107

Regional Unemployment
Rates

18.8860

First Quarter o f the Year

0.2233

0.4164

Second Quarter of the
Year

0.2603

0.4388

Third Quarter o f the Year

0.2614

0.4394

Fourth Quarter o f the Year

0.2610

0.4390

Year 1990

0.1032

0.3042

Year 1991

0.1357

0.3424

Year 1992

0.1528

0.3598

Year 1993

0.1556

0.3625

Year 1994

0.1548

0.3617

Year 1995

0.1489

0.3560

Year 1996

0.1490

0.3561

Variable Name
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